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I. INTRODUCTION
In this mobile, highly competitive, technology-driven, "e-commerce,"
entrepreneurial, information age, the preservation of a company's valuable,
proprietary information and knowledge - its intellectual property - emerges
as a paramount business concern. Naturally, it requires a great deal of time,
effort, and money to create and develop such information and knowledge.
This type of proprietary information typically allows a firm to differentiate
itself from others, and affords a company a competitive advantage. Yet, for a
firm to use efficaciously sensitive information, it typically has to reveal it to
a variety of people inside and outside the company. However, a firm certainly
does not want this information and knowledge being improperly used by a
current or former employee, or third party, or disclosed to a competitor.
Certain types of information can be protected, however, by a wide variety
of legal doctrines, such as federal patent, copyright, and trademark law, as
well as state contractual covenant not to compete and confidentiality-non-
disclosure law. Federal intellectual property law, moreover, has been held by
the U.S. Supreme Court not to have preempted state trade secret law!
Significantly, the law of trade secrets serves to protect a firm's valuable
proprietary information even when there is no patent or copyright to the
material and even when an enforceable contractual covenant not to compete
agreement or confidentiality-non-disclosure agreement does not exist.
Additionally, trade secrets, as opposed to patents, copyrights, and trademarks,
Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470,474 (1974) (patent law).
The Copyright Act "preempts only those state law rights that may be abridged by an act which,
in and of itself, would infringe one of the exclusive rights provided by federal copyright law."
To escape preemption, a state law claim must require proof of an "extra element" in lieu of or
in addition to the acts sated above. "A state law claim is not preempted if the extra element
changes the nature of the action so that it is qualitatively different from a copyright
infringement claim." Under the "extra element" test, state law claims of unfair competition
based on trade secrets or breach of confidential relationship and fiduciary duty survive
preemption.
All Pro Sports Camp, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 727 So. 2d 363, 366-67 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999) (citations
omitted).
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theoretically can endure forever, if properly safeguarded.2 The well-versed
corporate attorney, business manager, and incipient entrepreneur, therefore,
needs to be fully cognizant of all aspects of trade secret law; not only to
protect the firm's secret information, but also to avoid becoming entangled
in intellectual property legal disputes. The astute observer, in addition, will
discern the important fact that a firm's employees, and not only its scientists,
engineers, and technological people, are exposed to and acquire valuable
proprietary information during the course of their employment. Marketing
personnel, for example, regularly utilize highly confidential and valuable
information regarding the firm's business plan and marketing strategy.
However, determining whether a firm's business plans and strategies are
legally protected trade secrets that belong to the firm, especially in the role
of former employer, is an arduous task. The definition and elements to a
legal trade secret are not universally agreed upon. There is yet no single trade
secret law; rather, there are trade secret laws. Reference must be made to
three very important parts of this area of intellectual property law: 1) the
common law, especially as exemplified by those states that still adhere to the
venerable Restatement of Torts' explication of a trade secret; 2) state statutes,
most notably the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, and the cases interpreting that
key statute; and 3) a recent federal trade secret statute, the Economic
Espionage Act of 1996, and the cases interpreting that significant statute.
Additionally, the very new Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition, treats
trade secret law as part of the corpus of "unfair competition" law. The
common law, the statutes, and the cases construing the statutes supply
definitions of the foundational term "trade secret," and demonstrate when
certain business information can be deemed a legally protected trade secret.
From an examination of the statutes and legal precedents, one should be able
to discern the relevant legal criteria, and ascertain whether business plans and
2 Trade secret law, nevertheless, according to the United States Supreme Court, may provide:
Far weaker protection in many respects than patent law. While trade secret law does not forbid
the discovery of the trade secret by fair and honest means, e.g., independent creation or reverse
engineering, patent law operates "against the world," forbidding any use of the invention for
whatever purpose for a significant length of time. The holder of a trade secret also takes a
substantial risk that the secret will be passed on to his competitors, by theft or by breach of a
confidential relationship, in a manner not easily susceptible of discovery or proof.
Kewanee Oil Co., 416 U.S. at 489-90.
The protection afforded by the [trade secret] rule stated in this Section is in some respects
greater and in some respects less than that afforded by the patent law. It is greater in that it is
not limited to a fixed number of years and does not require novelty an invention as in the case
of patents. It is less in that secrecy of the process and impropriety of the method of procuring
the secret are requisite here but not in the case of patents.
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS S 757, cmt. a (1939).
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strategies are trade secrets. If plans and strategies are legally recognized trade
secrets, then a firm, especially the former employer, has the legal right to
protect this kind of information; and the former employee, as well as his or
her new employer, have a legal duty not to disclose or use such information.
This Article, accordingly, will examine trade secret law, and in particular
will attempt to ascertain whether a company's business plans and strategies
can rise to the level of legally protected trade secrets. If plans and strategies
are accorded such legal status, a determination must be made as to the legal
rights and responsibilities of the employer, the employee, and the new
employer. This Article especially will examine the steps a firm must take to
guard the confidentiality of its intellectual property and to help establish its
business plans and strategies as legally protected trade secrets.
I. THE COMMON LAW- THE RESTATEMENT OF TORTS
A. Introduction
Pursuant to traditional common law principles, an employee is free to
leave his or her job and use the general information and knowledge gained,
as well as skills acquired thereby, even in competition with the former
employer, so long as there are no elements of unfair competition or
contractual restrictive covenant violations involved. The common law stood
strongly in favor of the right of an employee, upon leaving a firm, to
continue to use his or her general information and knowledge, mental ability
and aptitude, as well as dexterity, skills, and experience, in a newjob or in an
entrepreneurial manner.
While he or she was employed, moreover, the common law recognized
the employee's right to organize and plan a competing business and even to
notify the employer's customers of the new business venture. A former
employee possesses the common law right to engage in a competitive
3 See, e.g., Elm City Cheese Co. v. Federico, 752 A.2d 1037 (Conn. 1999).
4 See Utah Med. Prods., Inc. v. Clinical Innovations Assocs., Inc., 79 F. Supp. 2d. 1290, 1312
(D. Utah 1999); W. Med. Consultants, Inc. v.Johnson, 80 F.3d 1331, 1337 (9th Cir. 1996); Christopher
M's Hand Poured Fudge, Inc. v. Hennon, 699 A.2d 1272,1275 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997); Campbell Soup Co.
v. Desamick, 58 F. Supp. 2d. 477,489-90 (D.N.J. 1999).
"It is well settled that an employer cannot claim as a trade secret an individual's general
knowledge of how to do his job." Actual application of the rule is quite difficult, in part
because it is affected by issues offundamental policy in the balancing ofthe employer's interest
in protecting the fruits of research as against the employee's interest in being able to move to
a new job.
James Pooley, The Litigation and Enforcement of Trade Secrets, 574 PRAC. LAW INST. 619, 624 (1999)
(Citations omitted).
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business for himself or herself and to enter into competition with the former
employer, even for the business of those who previously had been the
customers of the former employer, "provided such competition is fairly and
legally conducted."' Of course, the common law construed an employee's
actual competition against his or her current employer as an actionable
breach of the duty of loyalty to that employer.6
Finally, the common law recognized that a firm has the right to use its
own employees' knowledge and skills that legitimately have been acquired
and obtained. 'The privilege to compete with others. . includes a privilege
to adopt their business methods, ideas or processes of manufacture. Were it
otherwise, the first person in a field with a new process or idea would have
a monopoly which would tend to prevent competition."
7
Yet, the common law also consistently held that an employee owes a duty
of good faith and loyalty to his or her employer. Accordingly, during the
employment relationship, and even after the employment relationship is
terminated, the employee is prohibited from using trade secrets and other
confidential business information, acquired in the course of employment, to
the detriment of his or her employer.8
The common law has long recognized that there is certain vital
information that gives a firm a distinct competitive advantage. This
information, moreover, very likely was costly and difficult to develop or
secure, and thus represents a financial investment by the firm. When an
employee, especially a highly sophisticated employee, moves from one firm
to another, taking information, knowledge, and skills with him or her, and
then shares or uses it at the new company, difficult issues arise as to the legal,
ethical, and practical propriety of any disclosure or use. Trade secret law,
therefore, poses a complex set of problems regarding the rights and
obligations of companies, their competitors, and employees.
Underscoring the importance of this area of the law, the U.S. Supreme
Court has commented on trade secret policy concerns. Discussing a
Pennsylvania Supreme Court common law decision, the U.S. Supreme
Court emphasized "the importance of trade secret protection to the
subsidization of research and development and to increased economic
s See Bayer Corp. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 72 F. Supp. 2d. 1111, 1112 (N.D. Cal. 1999).
6 See, e.g., MQS Inspection, Inc. v. Bielecki, 963 F. Supp. 771,773 (E.D. Wis. 1995).
7 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §757, cmt. a (1939).
a See Utah Med. Prods., Inc., 79 F. Supp. 2d. at 1312.; Elm City Cheese Co., Inc., 752 A.2d at 1037;
Thierry Olivier Desmet, The Economic EspionageAct of 1996: Are We Finally Taking Corporate Spies Seriously,
22 Hous.J. INT'L L 93, 102 (Fall 1999) ("At common law, employers had a property right in their trade
secrets, and the disclosure of such confidential information in violation of an employment relation was
a tort.").
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efficiency within large companies through the dispersion of responsibilities
for creative development."9 Moreover, the Court articulated; "[tirade secret
law promotes the sharing of knowledge and efficient operation of industry;
it permits the individual inventor to reap the rewards of his labor by
contracting with a company large enough to develop and exploit it."10 Trade
secret law, moreover, should not prevent employees from exploiting their
own knowledge and skills and pursuing their livelihoods when they leave
their present positions.11 Trade secret law, therefore, should encourage
competition. t2 Yet, trade secret law should also grant businesses the
reasonable protection against unfair trade practices. 13 One court succinctly
underscored the inherent policy problem in trade secret law stating the
"conflict between two strong public policies . . . - the policy favoring
employee mobility free of encumbering restriction and the policy favoring
protection of genuine trade secrets." 4
The common law courts, therefore, have long struggled with perplexing
trade secret questions and conflicting rationales. Trade secret law, of course,
was originally articulated and developed by the state courts into a discrete
corpus of the common law. This body of law, moreover, like many other
common law legal doctrines, reflected a judicial balancing of competing
interests as well as an attempt to promote fairness in the marketplace. The
actual application of these conventional common law rules and rationales,
however, emerges as a very challenging modern-day task.
B. Overview of the Restatement
The first significant common law synopsis of trade secret law was
achieved in the 1939 Restatement of Torts,"s a compendium and synthesis of
common law decisions, as well as an authoritative legal source in and of itself.
The Restatement, specifically Comment b of section 757, provides the most
basic and still widely used definition of a trade secret.16 A trade secret therein
' Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470,482 (1974).
10 Id. at 493.
" See Utah Med. Prods., Inc., 79 F. Supp. 2d. at 1312; Electro Optical Indus., Inc. v. White, 90 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 680, 686 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999).
12 See Utah Med. Prods., Inc., 79 F. Supp. 2d. at 1312.
13 See id.
14 Bayer Corp. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 72 F. Supp. 2d. I11, 1119-20 (N.D. Cal. 1999).
is RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, §757 (1939).
16 See, e.g., Christopher M's Hand Poured Fudge, Inc. v. Hennon, 699 A.2d 1272, 1274-75 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1997) (indicating that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has adopted the Restatement's Section
757, comment b, definition of a trade secret); Brandwynne v. Combe Int'l, Ltd., 74 F. Supp. 2d. 364,376
(S.D.N.Y. 1999) (New York's use ofRestatement).
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may consist of information which is used in one's business and which
possesses economic value because it affords a firm an opportunity to secure
an advantage over a competitor, who does not know of, or use, the
information. This definition, of course, is not an exact one, as the Restatement
admits. The Restatement, however, does enumerate several factors that are to
be considered in determining whether certain information is a protected
trade secret. These factors include: 1) the extent to which the information is
known outside one's business; 2) the extent to which the information is
known by employees and others involved with the business; 3) the type and
degree of measures taken to guard the secrecy of the information; 4) the
value of the information to the company and its competitors; 5) the amount
of money and effort expended by the firm in developing this information; 6)
and the ease or difficulty with which the information could be acquired or
replicated properly by others.17 The plaintiff trade secret owner, typically a
former employer, bears the burden of establishing the existence of such a
trade secret.' 8
Texas, 9 Pennsylvania,20 and NewYork2' are three jurisdictions that have
consistently utilized the Restatement of Tort's definition and approach to trade
secrets. Significantly, unlike the large majority of other states, Texas,
Pennsylvania, and New York still have not explicitly adopted the Uniform
Trade Secret Act (UTSA) and its definition of trade secrets.
A trade secret, pursuant to the common law, is any information used in
the operation of a business that is in fact secret as well as sufficiently valuable
to a company to provide it with a competitive advantage over other firms.'
The common law courts construe a number of factors in determining
whether information is a trade secret, to wit: the secrecy of the information,
that is, how well is the information known, both inside the firm and outside
17 See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS S 757, cmt. b (1939); see, e~g., Christopher M's Hand Poured Fudge,
Inc., 699 A2d at 1275; Brandwynne, 74 F. Supp. 2d. at 376 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (NewYork's use ofRestatemeni
factors); Ram Prods. Co., Inc. v. Chauncey, 967 F. Supp. 1071, 1087-88 (N.D. Ind. 1997) ("strategic
planning information" of plastics manufacturing firm construed as trade secret under Michigan
Restatement factors, but insufficient evidence of misappropriation); State ex. rel. Utils. Comm'n v. MCI
Telecomm. Corp., 514 S.E.2d 276, 282-83 (N.C. Ct. App. 1999) (Restatement factors utilized to construe
the following as a trade secret of a communications firm: its business "plans for entering the local market
and how quickly it acquires new customers and in which areas of the state [it] is focusing its marketing
efforts and the relative effectiveness of these efforts.").
Is See, e.g., Christopher M's Hand Poured Fudge. Inc., 699 A.2d at 1275.
' See, e.g., Hyde Corp. v. Huffines, 314 S.W.2d 763, 776 (Tex. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 898
(1958); Lawfinders Assoc., Inc. v. Legal Research Ctr., Inc., 65 F. Supp. 2d. 414,417-18 (N.D. Tex. 1999).
M See, e.g., Christopher M's Hand Poured Fudge, Inc., 699 A.2d at 1274-75.
21 See, e.g., Brandwynne, 74 F. Supp. 2d. at 376; Earthweb, Inc. v. Schlack, 71 F. Supp. 2d. 299,314
(S.D.N.Y 1999); Desmet, supra note 8, at 103 and cases cited therein.
2 See Lawfinders Assoc., Inc., 65 F. Supp. 2d. at 418.
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the company; the degree of secrecy, that is, how well-protected is the
information from disclosure; the competitive advantage afforded by the
information, that is, what value does the information have for the firm and
its competitors; the time, money, and effort expended in developing the
information; and the difficulty of acquiring or replicating the information by
others. Yet, "[w]hen it comes down to actual application of what qualifies as
a trade secret, the only time 'trade secret' is ever really defined is in
litigation. " "
The "secrecy" factor is naturally a fundamental common law legal
criterion. As the Restatement succinctly states: "The subject matter of a trade
secret must be secret."24 Secrecy means the information remains neither
generally known by others in the same business, nor readily available or
accessible by independent investigation.2" Obviously, if information is
general or common knowledge, well-known, or publicly revealed, it is not
secret.26 Thus, a trade secret owner clearly "must do something to protect
itself."27 Yet, neither absolute secrecy need be achieved, nor are extravagant
security measures mandated. Rather, "reasonable" secrecy seems to be the
common law case norm, although the original Restatement uses the term
"substantial." 28 Thus, it is permissible under the common law for a firm to
make limited disclosures of proprietary information. 29 A confidential
communication can be safely made pursuant to an express or implied
obligation not to reveal or to disclose the information; and this disclosure can
be made to certain employees and select third parties, who need to apply the
information for its intended uses, without forfeiting trade secret protection.3 °
However, a disclosure outside or beyond such a confidential setting may
destroy one's trade secret legal protection.3'
Misappropriation is another essential element to the common law of
trade secrets.32 Misappropriation occurs when a trade secret is obtained by
23 James Pooley, The Top Ten Issues in Trade Secret Law, 70 TEMP. L. REv. 1181, 1190 (Winter
1997).
24 RESTATEMENT OF ToRTS S 757, cmt. b (1939); accord, Lawfinders Assoc., Inc., 65 F. Supp. 2d.
at 418 ("A key part ofthe definition of a trade secret is secrecy.").
25 See Lawfinders Assoc., Inc., 65 F. Supp. 2d. at 418-19.
2 RESTATEMENT OF ToRTS S 757, cmt. b (1939); Lawfinders Assoc., Inc., 65 F. Supp. 2d. at 418.
27 See Lawfinders Assoc., Inc., 65 F. Supp. 2d. at 418.
20 See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS 757, cmt. b (1939) ("[A] substantial element of secrecy must
exist, so that except by the use of improper means, there would be difficulty in acquiring the
information.").
29 See id.
30 See id.; Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470,475 (1974); LawfindersAssoc., Inc., 65
F. Supp. 2d. at 418.
31 See Flotec, Inc. v. S. Research, Inc., 16 F. Supp. 2d. 992, 1000 (S.D. Ind. 1998).
32 See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS 757(a-d) (1939).
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another by means of a breach of a confidential relationship, such as the
employer-employee relationship,33 or through improper methods, in the
sense of unreasonable, immoral, and devious behavior, such as bribery, theft,
wiretapping, and industrial espionage. 34 Misappropriation, moreover, occurs
when a trade secret is acquired with notice of its mistaken disclosure.35 It is
important to note that even if trade secret information can be discerned by
experimentation or other fair and lawful means, this type of discovery does
not deprive the owner of the legal right to protection from those
unscrupulous people who would obtain possession by illegal and unfair
means.36 As one federal district court emphasized, an important policy
rationale sustaining trade secret protection is "protecting business from
breaches of faith and reprehensible means of learning another's secret."37
The misappropriated trade secret, of course, then has to be acquired,
transmitted, or used; and consequently cause damages or threaten to inflict
harm to its rightful owner.3" A court, however, can enjoin the disclosure or
use of a trade secret, actual or threatened, regardless of whether the former
employee entered into a covenant or agreement restricting the disclosure or
use of such information.39
33 See, e.g., Christopher M's Hand Poured Fudge, Inc. v. Hennon, 699 A.2d 1272, 1276 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1997).
34 See Kewanee Oil Co., 416 U.S. at 476.
35 See Desmet, supra note 8, at 102.
See Lawfinders Assoc., Inc. v. Legal Research Ctr., Inc., 65 F. Supp. 2d. 414, 418 (N.D. Tex.
1998).
37 Id.
38 See id.; see, e.g., Christopher M's Hand Poured Fudge, Inc., 699 A2d at 1275.
39 See Lexis-Nexis v. Beer, 41 F. Supp. 2d. 950, 958 (D. Minn. 1999) ("[Tlhe record clearly
demonstrates that [defendant], a sales manager, did not have the kind of intimate familiarity with
corporate policies and strategies that might support a finding of inevitable disclosure under prior cases.");
see also LawfindersAssoc., Int., 65 F. Supp. 2d. at 417 (stating that plaintiffmust establish the following for
a preliminary injunction: 1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; 2) a substantial threat of
irreparable injury; 3) the threatened injury outweighs any damage the injunction might cause the
defendant; and 4) the injunction will not disserve the public interest.); Cardinal Freight Carriers, Inc. v.
J.B. Hunt Transp. Servs., Inc., 987 S.W.2d 642, 646-47 (Ark. 1999) ("A number of federal cases dealing
with trade secrets have held that a plaintiff may prove a claim of trade-secret misappropriation by
demonstrating that a defendant's new employment will inevitably lead him to rely on the plaintiff's trade
secrets.").
Courts in other jurisdictions have adopted the "inevitable disclosure" rule which permits a
former employer to enjoin an employee from working for a direct competitor "where the new
employment inevitably will lead [the employee] to rely on the [former employer's] trade
secrets." In other words, an injunction against the new employment may issue where the new
employment is "likely to result" in the disclosure of a former employer's trade secrets, or
where it would be "impossible for an employee to perform his or her new job without using
or disclosing those secrets."
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Trade secret common law, however, does not protect information that
is publicly obtainable, or information that can be discerned by fair, honest,
and reasonable efforts, such as independent invention, research, and
development, separate discovery, and the examination and analysis of
publicly available information, and products and services accessible for
purchase on the market."' One must be very careful, however, when
modifying or improving the trade secret of another because:
Electro Optical Indus., Inc. v. White, 90 Cal. Rptr. 2d 680,684 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999) (alteration in original)
(citations omitted); see also Elm City Cheese Co., Inc. v. Federico, 752 A.2d 1037, 1048 (Conn. 1999)
(upholding three-year injunction pursuant to Connecticut UTSA to prevent misappropriation and
disclosure of cheese manufacturing and sales firm's trade secret -its "entire business plan").
Generally, courts can impose two types of injunctions to protect trade secrets. A "use
injunction" bars a defendant from using a misappropriated trade secret in the manufacture of
a product, but does not otherwise interfere with the defendant's business. A "production
injunction," on the other hand, completely bars the defendant from manufacturing the type
of product in which the trade secret is utilized. Courts will generally impose the broader
production injunction when a trade secret is "inextricably connected" to the defendant's
manufacture of the product, because the defendant "cannot be relied upon to unlearn or
abandon the misappropriated technology."
Christopher M's Hand Poured Fudge. Inc., 699 A.2d at 1275 (citations omitted).
[C]ircumstances may be such that the likelihood of disclosure or misuse by a competitor
appears overwhelming by a court. This has led to the so-called "doctrine of inevitable
disclosure" (more accurately, inevitable misappropriation), under which circumstantial
evidence of likely misappropriation may be sufficient to support an injunction. Where the
doctrine is applied the outcome usually will not be an outright ban on employment, but a
more limited injunction that permits the employee to go to work but forbids participation in
some particular product line or area of the business.
Pooley, supra note 4, at 630-31.
"Inevitable disclosure" is a doctrine that holds that the threat of misuse can result in an
injunction, even though there has not been any actual misappropriation of a trade secret, and
even though the defendant, usually an individual employee who has moved from one place,
swears that he is not going to do it. The reason that the injunction is granted nevertheless is
that the court feels that from the circumstances presented, there is no way that the guy will not
misuse the information. The court is saying, "You cannot do your job and not misappropriate
trade secrets." It is not a new doctrine, but it has received a lot of recent use ....
Pooley, supra note 23, at 1186. Contra, Bayer Corp. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc-, 72 F. Supp. 2d. 1120,
1123 (N.D. Cal. 1999) ("In sum, the Court holds that California trade-secrets law does not recognize the
theory of inevitable disclosure; indeed such a rule would run counter to the strong public policy in
California favoring employee mobility. A trade-secrets plaintiff must show an actual use or an actual
threat.").
40 See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470,476 (1974); Brandwynne v. Combe Int'l,
Ltd., 74 F. Supp. 2d. 364,377 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Flotec, Inc. v. S. Research, Inc. 16 F. Supp. 2d. 992, 1000
(S.D. Ind. 1998); Lawfinders Assoc., Inc., 65 F. Supp. 2d. at 418; Dale P. Olson, Common Law
Misappropriation in theDigitalEra, 64 MO. L. REv. 837,864 (Fall 1999) (noting that information cannot be
"part of the general body of knowledge in an industry").
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To subject a person to liability ... for the use of another's trade
secret, there is no requirement that he use it in exactly the form
which he received it. He may be liable even if he uses it with
modifications or improvements upon it effected by his own efforts.
Differences in detail do not preclude liability if, substantially, the
process used by the actor is derived from the other's [trade]
41secret ....
Culpability may be avoided, or at least mitigated, when the trade secret's
contribution to the creation and development process is "so slight that the
actor's process can be said to be derived from other sources ... .,+2 "Reverse
engineering," finally, wherein a skilled and knowledgeable person inspects
and studies a product or service and ascertains how to produce it, by working
backward to divine the developmental and manufacturing processes, is
permissible pursuant to the common law.43 Reverse engineering is "even
encouraged under trade secret law.""
C. "Plans and Strategies" Case Law
Business plans and strategies, especially involving marketing the firm's
products and services, have been held by the courts to constitute common
law trade secrets in particular circumstances. Although dicta, the U.S.
Supreme Court has noted the viability and rationale for marketing data,
operational plans, and advertising campaigns as legally protected trade secrets.
It is hard to see how the public would be benefited by the disclosure
of customer lists or advertising campaigns; in fact, keeping such
items secret encourages businesses to initiate new and individualized
plans of operation, and constructive competition results. This, in
turn, leads to a greater variety of business methods than would
41 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS S 757, cmt. c (1939).
42 Id.
43 See Kewanee Oil Co., 416 U.S. at 476; LawjlndrsAssoc., Inc., 65 F. Supp. 2d. at 418; Olson, supra
note 40, at 866 ("Any disclosure by fair means, including reverse engineering and disassembly ofan object,
may defeat the continued existence of trade secret protection.").
Flotec, Inc., 16 F. Supp. 2d. at 1000. But see La Calhene, Inc. v. Spolyar, 938 F. Supp. 523, 529-
30 (W.D. Wis. 1996) ("possibility of reverse engineering a trade secret is a factor in determining how long
injunctive relief should last, but it does not establish necessarily that information is not a trade secret.").
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otherwise be the case if privately developed marketing and other data
were passed illicitly among firms involved in the same enterprise.4s
Moreover, the Court related:
The holder of a trade secret would not likely share his secret with a
manufacturer who cannot be placed under binding legal obligation
to pay a license fee or to protect the secret. The result would be to
hoard rather than to disseminate knowledge..., thereby depriving
the public of the maximum benefit of its use, or engage in the time-
consuming and economically wasteful enterprise of constructing
duplicative manufacturing and marketing mechanisms for the
exploitation of the invention. 46
The Supreme Court's general pronouncements set the stage for the
current application of the common law to concrete "plans and strategies"
trade secret disputes.' For example, Lawfinders Associates, Inc. v. Legal Research
Center, a federal district court decision applying Texas trade secret common
law, stands for the basic proposition that for information to qualify as a trade
secret, it must in fact be "secret. '4' Lawfinders Associates, Inc. involved a
dispute, arising out of a failed merger, between two competing firms that
provided legal research and writing services to attorneys. The plaintiff,
Lawfinders, sought an injunction against the defendant, Legal Research
Center, contending in relevant part that plaintiff's "direct response market
strategy, using free evaluations and fixed fee pricing, coupled with its specific
results-based guarantee, constitutes a trade secret."49 The court noted,
however, that the plaintiffs Chief Executive Officer testified that for the
previous four years, and before the merger discussions, the company had
publicly disclosed the information at issue, in its advertising and even in an
article by the CEO to a legal publication.'s The court, accordingly, concluded
that the information was neither private nor secret; and thus refused to
enjoin the defendant firm from "utilizing information in the public
domain.""'
45 Kewanee Oil Co., 416 U.S. at 483.
4 Id. at 486-87.
47 See Lawfinders Assoc., Inc., 65 F. Supp. 2d. at 414.
48 See id. at 418.
49 Id. at 423.
50 See id. at 422-23.
sI See id. at 423.
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Christopher M's Hand Poured Fudge v. Hennon,2 a Pennsylvania case,
involved a firm's valuable gourmet fudge recipe and attendant
manufacturing, marketing, customer, and financial information, which the
firm took adequate precautions to keep secret.13 A key employee, described
by the court as the owner's "right-hand man," and one of the few employees
with access to private information, was terminated (the parties dispute
whether he was fired or voluntarily resigned). Apparently he "stole"
numerous computer files and other documents that contained confidential
information.5 4 The defendant employee, "right-hand man," not only stole the
recipe and the manufacturing standards and processes, but also the firm's
business plans, expansion plans, market and financial analysis reports and
projections, market trend reports, customer lists and customer files, as well
as a whole host of other confidential information.5s Actually, when reading
the decision, one is hard-pressed to discern any potentially valuable
proprietary information that the defendant, whose job duties included "the
sensitive task of typing certain secret information into (plaintiffs) computer
system . . . ," did not steal.56 Consequently, the court found all the
aforementioned information to be legally protected trade secrets; the plaintiff
needed "absolute protection" therefore; and the court thereby upheld the
lower court's permanent injunction against the defendant, forbidding him
from engaging in the manufacture and sale of any type of fudge. 7
In Earthweb v. Schlack, 5 the federal district court applied the common law
Restatement approach to a NewYork dispute between an Internet information
technology website firm and its former vice-president responsible forwebsite
content. The court stated that the firm's "strategic content planning,"
including its "strategic thinking" behind the company's websites, and its
overall business plan, "could be afforded trade secret protection" based on the
Restatement's six factor test.59 Moreover, the court noted: "in some contexts,
courts have found that particularized marketing plans... may constitute
trade secrets." 6° However, the court refused to issue the requested injunctive
52 699 A.2d 1272 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997).
53 See id. at 1275 ("The precautions that he followed included: keeping only one written copy of
the recipe and storing offthe premises of his business... compartmentalizing the manufacturing process,
so that most employees would know only the portion of the recipe relating to their specific manufacturing
tasks.. . and revealing the entire recipe to very few key employees.").
s4 See id. at 1274-76.
ss See id.
S6 See id. at 1276.
57 See id. at 1277.
ss 71 F. Supp. 2d. 299 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
59 See id. at 314-16.
60 Id. at 314.
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relief because the company failed to establish any imminent or inevitable risk
of disclosure or use of the trade secrets by its former vice-president at a
competing firm.6'
Branduynne v. Combe International, Ltd.6 2 is another federal district court
case applying New York trade secret common law, specifically the
Restatement's six factor trade secret "test."6 Brandwynne involved a plaintiff, the
creator of a non-medicinal vaginal moisturizer, who wished to enter into a
joint venture agreement with the defendant, a large health and beauty
manufacturer and distributor, to produce and market the plaintiffs idea.64
The plaintiff shared her asserted "niche" concept, in a detailed forty page plus
document, which included not only the product, but also target market
segments and proposed advertising, prices structures, and distribution
channels, with the defendant firm; but the defendant rejected the plaintiffs
joint venture proposal.' Soon thereafter, the defendant began to develop and
market a comparable product, prompting the plaintiff to sue for
misappropriation of trade secrets, among other causes ofaction. 66 The federal
district court, however, disposed of plaintiff s trade secret claim on summary
judgment for two related reasons. The court first indicated that under New
York law, for an idea to be protected as a trade secret, it must demonstrate
"novelty and originality." 67As stated by the court: "[blecause non-novel ideas
are not 'property,' 'they cannot be stolen.' Ideas which are not novel 'are in
the public domain and may freely be used by anyone with impunity.
' 68
Moreover, whether an idea is novel is a question of law for the court which
can be decided on a motion for summary judgment.' Here, the plaintiff's
idea lacked novelty because the defendant firm "produced a mountain of
evidence showing that vaginal moisturizers and lubricants similar to
[plaintiffs] Very Privatem had been produced and marketed prior to
[plaintiffs] negotiations with [defendant] ."70 To bolster the "non-novel"
legal case against plaintiff, the court pointed to the Restatement's six criteria
used to ascertain whether information is a trade secret. The court specifically
applied factor number one (the extent to which information is known
outside the business) and six (the ease or difficulty with which the
61 See id. at 315.
62 74 F. Supp. 2d. 364 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
See id. at 376.
See id. at 366.
65 See id.
See id. at 369.
67 See id. at 374.
Id. at 375 (citations omitted).
69 See id.
70 Id. at 375-76.
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information can be properly acquired or duplicated by others), and based on
the facts, came to the "inescapable conclusion" that the plaintiff's concept
was not entitled to protection under the state's trade secret law.7 , Secondly,
the court declared that "[a]ssuming, arguendo, that [plaintiffs] marketing
concept and product were novel, original and confidential at the time she
conceived them and disclosed them to [defendant], they would have
certainly entered the public domain when the product was placed on sale and
disclosed to the public in a marketing campaign. " n The court continued:
"Once a trade secret is marketed and readily visible and ascertainable upon
inspection in the open market, it is no longer protected."73 Consequently,
since the plaintiff failed to meet "this threshold test of novelty," the
misappropriation of trade secret claim was dismissed.74
D. Conclusion
Even the succinct common law and Restatement explication conducted
herein should serve to demonstrate that non-scientific and non-technical
type of information, such as business plans and strategies, have been, still are,
and will be protected and fostered by traditional trade secret law.
IMl. STATE STATUTES- THE UNIFORM TRADE SECRET ACT
A. Introduction
In the 1970s, the creators of the second version of the Restatement of Torts,
the Restatement (Second) of Torts (which was formally promulgated by the
American Law Institute in 1977), failed to include the traditional trade secret
Restatement language, "having concluded that the law on unfair competition
had developed to the extent that it was outside the purview of general tort
law." 5 For many years, therefore, there was neither an up-to-date common
law compendium, nor any uniform state statutory treatment, pertaining to
trade secrets. In 1979, however, the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws, in an attempt to codify the common law, proposed
the Uniform Trade Secret Act (UTSA) for adoption by the states.76 Since
then, forty one states and the District of Columbia have adopted trade secret
7t See id. at 376.
7 Id. at 377.
" Id.
74 See id.
73 Pooley, supra note 4, at 623.
76 See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT, 14 U.LA 433 (1990); Pooley, supra note 4, at 623.
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statutes modeled on the UTSA.7 7 The UTSA, in fact, generally does
resemble the definition of a trade secret as well as the pertinent standards as
set forth in the Restatement of Torts and the common law.7' The UTSA
provides civil remedies 9 for the misappropriation' of a trade secret."' An
essential aspect of the UTSA's trade secret definition is whether the owner
thereof took reasonable measures to maintain the secrecy of the purported
trade secret.82 If a company's legally preserved and protected intellectual
property has been wrongfully infringed upon, the UTSA allows the wronged
firm to obtain an injunction prohibiting further use of the trade secret by the
misappropriating party. The UTSA also allows for the recovery of damages
in the amount of actual losses related to the misuse, as well as punitive
damages and attorneys fees. 3 One federal district court, commenting on a
state act, underscored two important policy reasons for affording statutory
legal protection to "commercial intangibles" such as trade secrets: "to prevent
exploitation by reprehensible business methods and to encourage
innovation."s4
7 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION S 39 (1995) (listing ofjurisdictions
adopting UTSA); S 688.001- .009 Fla. Stat. (2000) (listing ofjurisdictions); see also Desmet, supra note 8,
at 102; Vincent Chiappetta, Myth, Chameleon or Intellectual Property Olympian? A Normative Framework
Supporting Trade Secret Law, 8 GEO. MASON L. REV. 69,72 (Fall 1999).
78 See David P. Hathaway, Comment, Is the North Carolina Trade Secrets Protection Act Itself a Secret,
and Is the Act Worth Protecting? 7 N.C. L. REv. 2149, 2154 (1999) (comparative analysis of UTSA with
North Carolina statute and other jurisdictions). On the other hand, Pooley states:
This [UTSA trade secret] definition differs from the Restatement of Torts in three significant
ways: first, it clearly protects "negative information" [also known as 'blind alleys' - knowing
what not to do]; second, it requires the plaintiff to prove it took reasonable efforts to protect
secrecy; and third, it protects information that is not presently in commercial use, as long as
it has economic value.
Pooley, supra note 4 at 623.
79 See Desmet, supra note 8, at 105 ("The main advantage of the UTSA over the common law is
that it allows an aggrieved party to sue and recover from a third party that has accepted stolen
information.").
s See Pooley, supra note 4, at 623 ("misappropriation" broadly defined); Hathawaysupra note 78,
at 2155-56 (comparative analysis of"misappropriation" in state trade secret statutes); Desmet, supra note
8, at 105 ("The UTSA defines misappropriation similarly to the Restatement, but provides examples ofwhat
'improper means'... .
81 See Hathaway, supra note 78, at 2168-69 ("U]udicial interpretation of the 'trade secrets'
definition is generally sparse across the U.S. In fact, eighteen states have not interpreted the definition in
their trade secret statutes at all. ").
82 See id. at 2174-75 ("Usually, the most heavily litigated issue in trade secret cases is whether an
owner tried to protect the trade secret.").
8 See id. at 2163 ("Most states generally adopt the UTSA approach to the issues of injunctive
relief, damages, and attorneys' fees.").
64 Glasstech, Inc. v. TGL Tempering Sys., Inc., 50 F. Supp. 2d. 722, 729 (N.D. Ohio 1999.).
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The prevailing case law appears to indicate that Uniform Trade Secret
Act was intended to preempt all other civil non-contractual causes of action
based on the misappropriation of trade secrets.'-
B. Overview of the Uniform Trade Secret Act
For the purposes of this article, the Uniform Trade Secret Act as adopted
by Florida in 1988 will be the principal statutory version examined.a6 The
Florida Trade Secret Act defines a trade secret as:
[I]nformation, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program,
device, method, technique, or process .. . that: (a) . . . [d]erives
independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being
generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper
means by other persons who can obtain economic value from its
disclosure or use; and (b) . . . is the subject of efforts that are
reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy. 7
Demonstrating this statutory denotation as well as the other elements to
a misappropriation cause of action typically is the asserted owner's, usually
the former employer's, responsibility. 8 In order to prevail, the employer
must establish the necessary facts, ordinarily by a preponderance of the
evidence.89 The existence of a trade secret pursuant to the UTSA ordinarily
is a question of fact because a trade secret "necessarily involves the 'factual
as See, e.g., All Pro Sports Camp, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 727 So. 2d 363, 367 (Fla. 5th DCA
1999) ("Florida's Uniform Trade Secrets Act displaces tort law regarding trade secret misappropriation.");
Micro Display Sys., Inc. v. Axtel, Inc., 699 F. Supp. 202,205 (D. Minn. 1988) (Minnesota UTSA held
to displace all common law causes ofaction predicated on the misuse or misappropriation oftrade secrets).
86 See S 688.001 etseq., Fla. Stat. (Supp. 2000); see generally T. BarberBend NoncmpeteAgreements:
Using Florida's Trade Secrets Act to Prevent Former Employeesfrom Disclosing Sensitive Information to Competitors,
FLA. B.J., Mar. 1998, at 10f.
7 S688.002(4),Fla. Stat. (Supp. 2000);seealso, Electro Optical Indus., Inc. v. White, 90 Cal. Rptr.
2d 680, 684 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999) (comparable California UTSA trade secret definition).
Other states have added to their definition of "trade secrets" by naming tangible or specific
objects. For example, Colorado and Ohio include "listing of names, addresses, or telephone.
numbers." The Oregon statute includes drawings, cost data, and customer lists. Idaho
specifically includes computer programs to the UTSA definition, as do Montana and North
Dakota.
Hathaway, supra note 78, at 2158-59.
as See, e.g., Am. Red Cross v. Palm Beach Blood Bank, Inc. 143 F.3d 1407, 1411 (11th Cir. 1998)
(plaintiff in trade secret action bears burden of demonstrating both that the specific information it needs
to protect is secret and that it has taken reasonable steps to protect this secrecy).
09 See, e.g., ALTA Analytics Inc. v. Muuss, 75 F. Supp. 2d. 773, 785 (S.D. Ohio 1999).
20011
18 UNIVERS17Y OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAWREVIEW [Vol. 9:1
question ofwhether the 'secrecy' of the information has been maintained and
the ease or difficulty of obtaining the information from other sources. ' ' 9°
The question of whether a trade secret was used or disclosed improperly is
also a question of fact.91
This statutory definition is broad, and encompasses potential as well as
actual independent economic value, and even "negative" value. A company,
therefore, can secure recognition and protection of trade secrets not yet
implemented, or which perhaps it never chooses to realize. In addition, the
confidentiality of obstacles and dead-ends reached in planning, research, and
development can be maintained so as to prevent competitors from securing
an advantage by eliminating any comparable costly errors or
miscalculations.92 Ownership of a trade secret, moreover, need not be
exclusive; the fact that it neither is generally known nor readily ascertainable
is sufficient.93 One commentator has construed the UTSA's "value"
requirement as a "relatively low threshold," because "there is no significant
quantitative assessment of value. Nor is there any review of the information
for novelty or non-obviousness, as is the case under patent law; nor for
originality, as under copyright law."9' It is interesting to note, finally, that
neither the UTSA nor the Florida statutory version explicitly mentions the
presumably still valid common law "defenses" of independent creation and
development or reverse engineering.9 Some states, however, do expressly
incorporate the common law defenses into their state Acts.96
90 Nilssen v. Motorola, Inc, 963 F. Supp. 664,675 (N.D. 111 1997).
The existence of a trade secret under the Kansas Uniform Trade Secrets Act is a question of
fact for determination by the trier of fact. Whether customer information is generally known
or readily ascertainable is a question of fact. Similarly, whether the possessor of such
information has taken reasonable steps to protect its secrecy is also a question of fact.
BioCore, Inc. v. Khosrowshahi, 96 F. Supp. 2d. 1221, 1224 (D. Kan. 2000).
91 BioCore, Inc., 96 F. Supp. 2d. at 1224.
92 See, e.g., Nilssen, 963 F. Supp. at 683 (citations omitted) ("Indeed, Motorola might face liability
for misappropriation under [Illinois UTSA] even if it used [inventor's] trade secrets 'only to demonstrate
what pitfalls to avoid.'"); see also Olson, supra note 40, at 865 (The UTSA includes "within the definition
of'trade secret' information which has a negative value, such as the realization that a process is ineffective
or a list of customers who do not purchase the competitor's products."); Jennifer L. Blackman & Patricia
M. Thayer, Avoiding Trade Secret Problems When Hiring, Vol. 16 COMPUTER LAw. 8, 10 n.14 (Nov. 1999)
(discussion and cases concerning "negative value").
93 See, e.g., Health Care Mgmt. Consulting, Inc. v. McCombes, 661 So. 2d 1223, 1226 (Fla. 1st
DCA 1995), rehearing denied, 670 So. 2d. 938 (1995) (consultant's purported confidential method of
presenting and interpreting Medicare regulations to clients in home health care industry was not a trade
secret because essence of claim concerned interpretation of federal regulations which was readily
ascertainable through researching Code of Federal Regulations).
9 Chiappetta, supra note 77, at 77.
9s See Hathaway. supra note 78, at 2158; Chiappetta, supra note 77, at 78.
96 See CAL. CML CODE S 3426.1(a) (West 1999) ("reverse engineering" and "independent
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Trade secret law under the UTSA is a conditional legal corpus.
Accordingly, the trade secret owner must take "reasonable" security
measures, both internal and external, to meet the statutory trade secret
definition. Insufficient security steps and procedures, therefore, will
jeopardize the employer's ability to pursue legal relief. Yet, protective
measures do not have to be absolute, extreme, or even state-of-the-art, only
"reasonable"; 97 and thus a company (or individual inventor or entrepreneur)
has some flexibility as to security, depending on size, type of information, the
nature of the business, and the expense and effort involved. A firm or
individual definitely is not required to protect against unanticipated,
unforeseeable, undetectable, and unpreventable modes of discernment and
disclosure." However, as a practical "secrecy" matter, according to one
commentator, "taking substantial protective steps is vitally important. In
many trade secret disputes, the holder's efforts to preserve secrecy are a key
point of attack. Omissions are frequently difficult tojustify as 'reasonable' in
retrospect. Consequently, holders of valuable trade secrets normally take
many self-help protective measures.. . ."" The issue of secrecy, finally, is
regarded as a question of fact to be determined by the trier of fact based on
the circumstances of each case.
1' °
Trade secret law involves two fundamental tests: one is ascertaining
whether a trade secret exists; and the second is determining whether it was
misappropriated. That is, in addition to proving the existence of a legally
defined trade secret, the owner, typically a company, must show that some
person, usually a former employee working with a new employer, has
actually misappropriated the trade secret or is "threatening" to misappropriate
it.10 1  Generalized knowledge of a firm's business plan and marketing
information, however, does not equal "misappropriation," because "the law
will not prevent competition just because a former employee has the
derivation" not considered as "improper" means).
9 See Chiappetta, supra note 77, at 77; seeaLso Pooley, supra note 23, at 1184 ("[Tlhe law on trade
secrets is flexible enough to say, 'Well, we deal in relative secrecy, not absolute secrecy....'").
See, e.g., Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Comm. Servs., Inc., 923 F. Supp. 1231,1254
(N.D. Cal. 1995); Rockwell Graphic Sys., Inc. v. Dev. Indus., Inc., 925 F.2d 174, 180 (7th Cir. 1991).
9 Chiapctta, supra note 77, at 77.
103 See Motor City Bagels, L.L.C. v. Am. Bagel Co., 50 F. Supp. 2d. 460,480 (D. Md. 1999).
t01 Plaintiffhas not shown that defendant has actually misappropriated any of its trade sec-
rets, that is, put them to use. Plaintiffdoes not need to make this showing in order to obtain
a preliminary injunction. It is sufficient to show the threat of misappropriation. The threat of
misappropriation is very real. Defendant's position with plaintiff gave him such intimate
knowledge of plaintiff's research, product development, finances, marketing strategies and
pricing information that it is all but inevitable that he will use that knowledge during his work
with [new employer] or any other competitor, so long as he is selling a competing product.
La Calhene, Inc. v. Spolyar, 938 F. Supp. 523, 530-31 (W.D. Wis. 1996).
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potential to be an immediate competitor. " 102 Legally recognized
"misappropriation" clearly occurs when a person acquires another's trade
secret, uses it, and knows, or has reason to know, that the trade secret was
acquired by improper means.'0 3 Motive therefore, specifically improper
motive, is an important feature to the statute. Improper means include theft,
bribery, fraud and misrepresentation, breach or an inducement of a duty of
secrecy, and espionage, physical or electronic.' 4 Misappropriation, however,
also occurs when a trade secret is disclosed or used without express or
implied consent by a person who owed a legal duty to maintain the secrecy
of the information. 05 Bribery, theft, and industrial espionage obviously are
improper "misappropriation" means.' 6 When a former employee reveals a
former employer's trade secret to the new employer in violation of a duty of
confidentiality, statutorily impermissible "misappropriation" has resulted. 7
However, merely evaluating another's trade secret, especially if pursuant to
a confidentiality agreement, does not rise to the level of
"misappropriation."' ° Yet, it is not necessary to a successful cause of action
that the alleged misappropriator copy the trade secret exactly."° Rather, one
can be held liable as a misappropriator, even if he or she uses a trade secret
"with modifications or improvements effected upon it by his [or her] own
efforts, so long as the substance of the process used by the actor is derived
'0 Utah Med. Prods., Inc. v. Clinical Innovations Assocs., Inc., 79 F. Supp. 2d. 1290, 1313 (D.
Utah 1999).
103 See S 688.002(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (Supp. 2000); see also, Religious Tech. Ctr., 923 F. Supp. at 1250
(misappropriation defined and explained pursuant to California UTSA); Cardinal Freight Carriers, Inc.
v. J.B. Hunt Transp. Servs., Inc., 987 S.W.2d 642, 646 (Ark. 1999) (misappropriation defined and
explained pursuant to Arkansas UTSA); UtahMd. Prods., Inc., 79 F. Supp. 2d. at 1311-13 (Utah UTSA);
Nilssen v. Motorola, Inc., 963 F. Supp. 664, 679 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (Illinois UTSA); Blackman & Thayer,
supra note 92, at 9 n.2 ("UTSA contains an actual or constructive standard for liability.").
104 See S 688.002(1), Fla. Stat. (Supp. 2000); see, e.g., Int'l Monetary Exch., Inc. v. First Data Corp.,
63 F. Supp. 2d. 1261, 1264-65 (D. Colo. 1999) (corporate victim of fraudulent scheme had standing to
sue for misappropriation of trade secrets, based on defendant corporation's attempt to purposefully cause
the bankruptcy of joint venture type firm, possessing plaintiff's valuable business plans, in order to
wrongfully acquire business plans).
105 See S 688.002(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (Supp. 2000); Nilssen, 963 F. Supp. at 679 (Illinois UTSA).
106 Bad acts misappropriation rests on public order and "commercial privacy" objectives.
The former provides cost-effective "private" support to criminal and tort law deterrence of acts
that threaten public order by preventing the use of the information that triggered the act. The
latter promotes economic efficiency by replacing private self-help with less costly legal rights.
Chiappetta, supra note 77, at 73.
107 See S 688.002(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (Supp. 2000); Nissen, 963 F. Supp. at 679; Chiappetta, supra note
77, at 78.
108 See Nilssen, 963 F. Supp. at 682.
109 See id. at 683.
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from the other's secret."" ° Most interestingly, moreover, authority exists for
the proposition that "the placement of key employees in a position where
they might assimilate a trade secret permits an inference of
misappropriation.""' The party asserting misappropriation, finally, who is
typically the former employer, must establish the existence of a trade secret
and each trade secret factor to sustain his or her "misappropriation" cause of
action."
2
The civil remedies provided by the Act include an injunction against
actual or threatened misappropriation, as well as various types of monetary
damages - actual, unjust enrichment, "reasonable royalty," and punitive, as
well attorney's fees. 13 Actual damages are, of course, the victim's actual loss;
and the unjust enrichment element is the amount of unjust enrichment not
taken into account in computing this actual loss." 4 Thus, a court awarding
damages can consider the trade secret owner's loss, the misappropriator's
gain, or both. Alternatively, in lieu of the preceding measurements to
damages, the aggrieved party's damages may be measured by the imposition
of a reasonable royalty for the misappropriation."' In addition, if the
misappropriation was willful and malicious, a court may award punitive
damages.' 1 6 Attorney's fees, finally, although not mandated by the statute,
110 Id.
III Id.
112 See, e.g., Utah Med. Prods., Inc. v. Clinical Innovations Assocs., Inc., 79 F. Supp. 2d. 1290,
1312 (D. Utah 1999) ("[P] laintiffmust substantiate more than vague and unsubstantiated allegations...
in order to satisfy its burden"); Lexis-Nexis v. Beer, 41 F. Supp. 2d. 950,958 (D. Minn. 1999); Noah v.
Enesco Corp., 911 F. Supp. 299, 304 (N.D. II. 1995) ("The plaintiff has the burden of proving that its
trade secrets are in fact 'secret.'").
11 See S 688.004(1), Fla. Stat. (Supp. 2000).
114 See id.
Its See id.
Maryland UTSA "provides that damages caused by misappropriation alternatively 'may be
measured by imposition of a liability for a reasonable royalty for a misappropriator's
unauthorized disclosure or use of a trade secret.'" Under this provision, the plaintiffs in the
case at bar are entitled to monetary damages in the form of royalties as a result of the
defendants' unauthorized distribution of their business plan to prospective franchisees.
Motor City Bagels, L.L.C. v. Am. Bagel Co., 50 F. Supp. 2d. 460,480 (D. Md. 1999) (citations omitted);
se also Chiappetta, supra note 77, at 79 ("In a significant departure from the traditional approach, the
UTSA also incorporates a compulsory licensing remedy. Ifa court finds that prohibiting future use would
be unreasonable under the circumstances of the case, it has the authority to permit continued use
conditioned upon payment of a reasonable royalty.").
116 See S 688.004(2), Fla. Stat. (Supp. 2000) (but punitive award not to exceed twice the actual
and/or unjust enrichment award); see also Elm City Cheese Co., Inc. v. Federico, 752 A.2d 1037, 1055
(Conn. 1999) (punitive award of $300,000 upheld under Connecticut UTSA for willful, knowing, and
malicious misappropriation, "amply supported by the record," offamilycheese manufacturing firm's trade
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may be awarded by a court in a reasonable amount to the prevailing party if
the misappropriation was willful and malicious or a claim of
misappropriation is made in bad faith."' The potential for injunctive relief
is a very important remedial feature of the Act." 8 It is important to note that
an injunction may issue independently, based on a violation of the trade
secret act, even when a contractual covenant not to compete does not exist, 1 9
"which some people have likened to the 'sky is falling' because they see it as
the judicial imposition of non-compete covenants that never existed in the
first place."" ° Moreover, the Act permits an injunction to issue not only for
actual misappropriations, but also for "threatened" (at times referred to as
"inevitable") wrongful appropriations."' A firm, therefore, does not have to
delay and tolerate a former employee disclosing valuable proprietary
information before securing an injunction. An injunction, moreover, can be
granted for the duration of time it would have taken the misappropriator to
discover the trade secret through lawful methods. An injunction pursuant to
the Act also can be quite a stringent remedy, because it not only can prohibit
the former employee from revealing trade secrets, but also can restrain the
employee from working for a competitor for a reasonable period of time.
1 2
A business owner of a trade secret, finally, very well may be reluctant to
commence a lawsuit because litigation will create a public record to which
competitors can gain access. The UTSA, however, has a provision to deal
secret- its "entire business plan" - by defendant, the key employee, vice-president in charge ofday-to-day
operations, long-time family friend, "trusted advisor and confidant," and firm's and family's accountant).
"We previously have noted that [defendantI used confidential business information that he was duty
bound, by both statute and the ethics of his profession, to keep confidential." Id.
,11 See S 688.003(1), Fla. Stat. (Supp. 2000); see also Elm City Cheese Co., 752 A.2d 1037, 1055
(Conn. 1999) (attorney's fee award of $100,000 upheld under Connecticut UTSA).
it See Chiappetta, supra note 77, at 79 ("Generally, once the court finds misappropriation, it issues
an injunction as a mater of course. The UTSA expressly contemplates that the injunction will last only
for the duration of the trade secret plus a reasonable additional time, if necessary to 'eliminate commercial
advantage' resulting from the misappropriation.").
119 See, e.g., Elm City Cheese Co., 752 A2d 1037 (Conn. 1999) (three year injunction upheld
pursuant to Connecticut LUTSA to prevent misappropriation of manufacturing and sales cheese firm's
"entire business plan").
120 Poolcy, supra note 23, at 1186.
121 See S 688.003(1), Fla. Stat. (Supp. 2000); see also Electro Optical Indus., Inc. v. White, 90 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 680, 684 (Cal. C. App. 1999) (comparable language in California LUTSA); Cardinal Freight
Carriers, Inc. v.J.B. Hunt Transp. Sews., Inc., 987 S.W.2d 642, 646-47 (Ark. 1999) (injunction proper
remedy for "threatened or inevitable misappropriation of trade secrets" pursuant to Arkansas UTSA and
federal case law). But see Bayer Corp. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 72 F. Supp. 2d. 1111, 1120 (N.D. Cal.
1999) ("To the extent that the theory of inevitable disclosure creates a de facto covenant not to compete
without a nontrivial showing of actual or threatened use or disclosure, it is inconsistent with California
policy and case law.").
12 See, e.g., ALTA Analytics Inc. v. Muuss, 75 F. Supp. 2d. 773, 786 (S.D. Ohio 1999).
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with this legitimate concern; that is, the statute states that a court shall
preserve the secrecy of alleged trade secrets by reasonable means, including
private hearings and sealed records."u
C. "Plans and Strategies" Case Law
1. THE"INFORMATION" REQUIREMENT
For many firms, information is the most important resource at hand.
The courts have recognized this fact; and accordingly have expressed a
willingness to consider a sufficiently broad definition of trade secret
"information" to encompass business plans and strategies. 4 Some state
statutes, moreover, specifically include business "plans" as part of the
definition of "trade secret.""2
The following business plans and strategies cases examine the
"information" predicate to UTSA trade secret protection; and seek to
ascertain whether certain information is appropriate for trade secret
protection.
a. "Information" Not Found
In Alagold Corp. v. Freeman 6 a federal district court case applied the
Alabama Trade Secrets Act, particularly the definition of a trade secret, to
resolve a dispute between the plaintiff, the former corporate employer, and
the defendants, the ex-employee and new employer. The plaintiff contended
that the defendants in essence "cloned" its business of manufacturing and
selling decorative tapestry pillows by misappropriating proprietary
123 See S 688.003(6), Fla. Stat. (Supp. 2000).
124 See, e.g., Freedom Newspapers, Inc. v. Egly, 507 So. 2d 1180,1184 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987) ("The
sometimes nebulous designation 'business information' has long been recognized as potentially subject
to protection."); Enter. Leasing Co. of Phoenix v. Ehmkc, 3 P.3d 1064, 1070 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000)
("information" label, as well as trade secret protection, extended to "market research" and even to
"customer service principles"); Bd. of Regents of State of Florida ex. rel. Univ. ofS. Florida v. Taborsky,
648 So. 2d 748, 754 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994), reh'g denied, review denied, 654 So. 2d 920 (legal protection
extended to research); Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Comm. Servs., Inc., 923 F. Supp. 1231,
1252 (N.D. Cal. 1995) ("Indeed, there is no authority for excluding any type of information because of
its nature."); Chiappetta, supra note 77, at 76 ("Trade secret law... extends to technical and non-technical
information, expression, ideas, and facts, embracing such things as... future marketing, sales and product
plans...."); Pooley, supra note 23, at 1182 ("Trade secrets cover not only technical information, but also
a vast amount of business information, including forecasts and business plans .... ").
12 See, e.g., ALTA Analytics Inc., 75 F. Supp. 2d. at 785 (Ohio statutory version of UTSA).
126 20 F. Supp. 2d. 1305 (M.D. Ala. 1998).
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information, including trade secrets. One key issue in Alagold Corp. was
whether knowledge and expertise of how to develop business strategies,
market products, and develop relationships with customers and suppliers,
inter alia, could meet the "information" requirement to the state's statutory
definition of a trade secret. 2 The court referred to such knowledge and
expertise as "head knowledge," which it defined as "memory or general
knowledge gained through employment experience"; and ruled that this
"head knowledge" did not meet the "information" element of the state's trade
secret definition." What really seemed to bolster the defendants' trade
secret rejoinder, however, was the conspicuous lack of reasonable efforts to
maintain the secrecy of the purported "information. "13
Another interesting "information" case is the Wisconsin court ofappeal's
decision in Leske v. Leske131 which applied the state's UTSA. In Leske, the
plaintiffclaimed that his parents misappropriated his idea, program, and plan
to establish a business in the county to manufacture, distribute, and sell ice
for commercial use.'32 As to the specific issue whether the plaintiff's business
plan was "information" which could qualify as a trade secret pursuant to the
UTSA, the appeals court upheld the dismissal on summary judgment of that
claim. 33 The facet most engaging about the case is the rationale behind the
dismissal. Apparently, the state court of appeals adopted the lower court's
quasi-causation test and analysis in sustaining the dismissal of the business
plan aspect of the case.' 34 The lower court, as related by the appeal's court,
explained that "even if the defendants did obtain information, which the
plaintiff had gathered, they still had to finance and develop their ice business,
purchase equipment and facilities, and find customers. The information is
far removed from the actual operation of the ice business, the end product.
The effect is indirect.""3' The court of appeals agreed with this reasoning,
underscoring that the plaintiff's parents' acts "constituted only a feeble step
in competitive war."136 The appeals court thus seems to have constructed, in
Wisconsin at any regard, a causation element to business plan trade secret
law. However, as to the other claimed trade secrets of the proposed ice
business, for example, the formulas, methods, and techniques, the court
' See id. at 1309-10.
128 See id. at 1314-15.
129 Id.
13 See id. at 1315-16.
13 539 N.W.2d 719 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995).
132 See id. at 720-21.
133 See id. at 722-23.
13 See id.
135 Id. at 722.
13 Id. at 723.
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reversed the dismissal of the misappropriation cause of action, principally
because issues of fact remained as to whether the plaintiff took reasonable
steps to keep that information secret from his parents.'37
b. "Information" Present
An excellent, most instructive, UTSA decision is the Connecticut
Supreme Court case of Elm City Cheese Co. v. Federico.' The case is
significant not only for its restatement of basic common law employment
and trade secret principles, but also for its explication of the three major
requirements of the state's UTSA (the information, value, and secrecy
requirements of a trade secret), as well as the wide variety and severity of
redress granted for the misappropriation. Elm City Cheese Co. revolved about
an attempt, described by the court as knowing, willful, malicious, and
unethical, by the defendant to misappropriate the plaintiff firm's business
operations and "entire business plan," encompassing the research,
development, production, sales, distribution, and marketing aspects
thereto. 39  The plaintiff was a small family-owned company that
manufactured and sold cheese products in a specialized niche market.' 4 The
defendant was a close, long-term, family friend, a "trusted advisor and
confidant," the firm's vice-president in charge of day-to-day operations, and,
as the court stressed, not only the firm's but also the family's certified public
accountant. 141 The first issue the Supreme Court of Connecticut had to
address was whether the firm's "entire business plan" met the "information"
requirement of the state statute. Referring to the statute's definition, and the
examples of "information" enumerated therein, the court stated that in order
to constitute a trade secret, "information must be of the kind included in the
nonexhaustive list contained in the statute. The first step in our analysis,
therefore, is a determination ofwhether the information at issue satisfies this
threshold requirement."4 2 Accordingly, the court found that the firm's
business operations and its "entire business plan," including all the
components thereof, constituted "information" potentially subject to
statutory trade secret protection.'
43
137 See id. at 721-22.
"3 752 A.2d 1037 (Conn. 1999).
139 See id. at 1040.
140 See id.
14 See id.
142 Id. at 1041.
'43 See id.
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Nilssen v. Motorola, Inc.,14 a federal district court case applying the Illinois
UTSA, is similar in one important "information" respect to the previous Elm
City Cheese Co. case. A key issue for the court in Nilssen was whether the
plaintiffinventor's compilation of "non-technical" information pertaining to
electronic ballast technology, which was offered to the defendant Motorola
pursuant to a confidentiality agreement, met the "information" requirement
of the state statute. 14' The compilation of non-technical information in
question encompassed the plaintiff's strategic plan, "entry strategy," potential
channels for distribution, information concerning the size and structure of
the market, including prevailing methods of distribution, and research and
analysis as to expected profitability. 146 Defendant Motorola contended, and
the court agreed, that state law does not treat "generalized confidential
business information" as a protectable trade secret." 7 Nevertheless, the court
concluded that the plaintiffs compilation of non-technical information was
"not so lacking in specificity as to require [summary judgment] dismissal of
his Illinois Act claim."'" The more pressing issue for the court was whether
this "information" allegedly misappropriated by Motorola possessed the
necessary statutory "value."
Religious Technology Center v. Netcom On-Line Communications Services,
Inc." 9 was a rather unique, and interesting, trade secret dispute at the federal
district court level. The court applied the California UTSA to resolve the
lawsuit between the Church of Scientology and one of its most vocal critics,
a former minister. The defendant former minister, in an attempt to create
heated critical debate, published certain writings of the Church's founder, L.
Ron Hubbard, on the internet. The Church, through one of its affiliated
organizations, sued its former minister, as well as the communications
company Netcom, for misappropriating its trade secrets, among other causes
of action."0 The first trade secret issue for the court to determine was
whether the writings of the founder of a religion can be included in the
"information" definition to the state statute. The court first noted that the
original Restatement explicitly did not preclude a religion from holding a trade
secret."' Moreover, the court indicated that "there is at least some precedent
for granting trade secret status to works that are techniques for improving
'" 963 F. Supp. 664 (N.D. III. 1997).
145 See id. at 673-74.
W See id. at 673.
147 See id. at 674.
14B Id. at 673.
149 923 F. Supp. 1231 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
ISO See id. at 1238-39.
s15 See id. at 1251.
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oneself [though not specifically spiritually]. Conversely, there is no authority
for excluding religious materials from trade secret protection because of their
nature."'52 Finally, the court underscored: "[i]ndeed, there is no authority
for excluding any type of information because of its nature."' s3  Thus
concluded the court: "[w]hile the trade secret laws did not necessarily
develop to allow a religion to protect a monopoly in its religious practices,
the laws nonetheless have expanded such that the Church's techniques,
which clearly are 'used in the operation of the enterprise,' are deserving of
protection if secret and valuable."' s"
The preceding "information" cases clearly reveal that the "information"
predicate in trade secret law is expansively construed by the courts. Actually,
as one commentator has noted, "(t)he broad scope given this requirement is
one of the major benefits of trade secret protection."' s Legally recognized
"information," however, still must possess the necessary "value."
2. THE "VALUE" REQUIREMENT
The UTSA requires that trade secret type "information" possess
independent economic "value" from not being generally known or readily
ascertainable by proper means by other persons who can obtain economic
value from the information's use or disclosure. The following business plans
and strategies cases examine this essential "value" aspect to trade secret law.
a. "Value" Not Found
Noah v. Enesco Corp.'6 involved a federal district court case construing
the "value" requirement pursuant to the Illinois UTSA. Noah involved the
plaintiff, an artist, who created several handmade figurines based on his
interpretation of the Biblical Noah's Ark story.5 7 The figurines, called New
Beginnings, were based on the plaintiff's concept of depicting the animals as
interacting pairs.' 8 The plaintiff submitted his concept, pursuant to a non-
disclosure agreement, to the defendant, the nation's largest marketer of
giftware, in an attempt to negotiate a licensing agreement.' The defendant,
IS2 Id. at 1252.
IS3 Id.
154 Id.
1s5 Chiapetta, supra note 77, at 76.
1s6 911 F. Supp. 299 (N.D. I1. 1995).




28 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9:1
however, soon thereafter introduced its new line of Noah's Ark's figurines,
which also showed the animals interacting as pairs."6 Whereupon, plaintiff
sued for misappropriation of trade secret, arguing that the defendant
incorporated his "unique concept" into its line, made a large profit thereby,
and effectively closed him out of the market.'6 ' The court first noted that
both the common law and the state statute preclude trade secret legal
protection for information not generally known to the public, but clearly
understood in a particular industry. 2 The court also recounted that
"(s)imply being the first or only one to use certain information does not in
and of itself transform otherwise general knowledge into a trade secret. " " 3
The defendant countered plaintiffs trade secret allegation by arguing the
"notoriety" of the Noah's Ark theme, similar depictions of the theme by
other giftware marketers and the Franklin Mint, and the fact that plaintiff had
publicly disclosed his concept, thus "destroying" any trade secret status.
16
4
The plaintiff responded by contending he did not destroy the concept's trade
secret status by publicly revealing it. Rather, he claimed that he discussed the
feasibility of the project with only a "handful of advisors."' 6s Plaintiff
asserted, moreover, that "his consultations with those persons to whom it
was necessary to confide in do not convert his concept into general
knowledge within the industry."" Finally, he stated that "the existence of
the confidentiality agreement between these parties evidences the measures
taken to protect the secrecy of his 'New Beginnings' concept." 167 The court,
however, declared that" [p] laintiffoverlooks the necessity of establishing that
the concept is not 'generally known to other persons who can obtain an
economic benefit from [it].""" The court then stated that the plaintiff
"offers no argument in response to the evidence presented by [defendant]
that other giftware marketers depicted the Ark animals interacting with each
other as they descended the Ark before he presented his 'New Beginnings'
concept to [defendant]."' 69 Consequently, the court held that "[t]his
evidence negates [plaintiffs] contention that his concept was new and not
1W See id. at 301-02.
161 See id. at 302.




166 Id. at 304-05.
167 Id.
"6 Id. at 305.
"59 Id.
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generally known in the industry."170 The court, therefore, concluded that the
plaintiff's concept was not a trade secret as defined by the Act.'7 '
In Electro Optical Industries v. White, a case decided pursuant to the
California UTSA, the California appeals court rejected a claim that certain
"nontechnical" information, including marketing plans and sales strategies,
regarding the sale of infrared test equipment devices, was a legally protected
trade secret subject to injunctive relief'7 3 The court based its decision on the
premise that the plans and strategies lacked economic value because they
were "commonly known." 74 Specifically, the plans and strategies that were
branded legally insufficient "common" knowledge by the court encompassed
"offering [products] through producers of compatible, noncompetitive
products, participating in industry seminars, and 'private labeling'
components made by other producers."17' Thus, the defendant former
employee, the corporate plaintiffs sales manager and key sales contact, could
use and "emulate" this general information at his new job with a competing
employer
6
Similarly, inJ.E. Hanger, Inc. v. Scussel,'" the federal district court, in
applying Georgia's account of the UTSA, rejected a claim that pricing
strategies and marketing plans of a firm that sold and serviced medical
devices were legally protected trade secrets.' The court termed the firm's
plans and strategies as "hardly a unique approach" and "a fairly common
thing;" and thus since they were, in the court's opinion, readily ascertainable
by proper means, the plans and strategies could not qualify as trade secrets
pursuant to the state statute. 79 The firm's customer list, however, did meet
the statutory criteria for a trade secret, and accordingly an appropriate
injunction was issued.'8
Lexis-Nexis v. Beer'8' is a federal district case administering Minnesota's
UTSA to a dispute between one of the largest electronic data services
companies in the world and one of its former salespersons, who left to work
for a competitor and there to perform substantially the same duties. The
170 Id.
171 See id.
17 90 Cal. Rptr. 2d 680 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999).
173 See id. at 686.
174 See id. at 685-86.
175 Id. at 686.
176 See id.
1" 937 F. Supp. 1546 (M.D. Ala. 1996).
178 See id. at 1558.
IN See id.
IO See id. at 1559-60.
181 41 F. Supp. 2d. 950 (D. Minn. 1999).
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plaintiff company contended that certain "sensitive" company documents,
including sales strategies and policies, imparted to the former employee were
misappropriated trade secrets subject to injunctive relief.'8 The defendant,
however, countered by introducing evidence that the information at issue
was "either readily ascertainable or will quickly become obsolete, thereby
losing its independent economic value. "s' 3 The court, in denying the
injunction, merely stated that it could not ascertain from the record, which
was "contradictory" in nature, whether the information constituted trade
secrets under the state statute. 18
Western Medical Consultants, Inc. vJohnson'85 was a Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals decision which construed "value" under the Oregon UTSA. The
case involved a salesperson for the plaintiff, a company which provided
medical examination services, who resigned to commence her own
competing firm."' The plaintiff contended that its former employee
misappropriated its trade secrets, specifically its marketing plans and
customer lists.' 7 The court, however, noted that the customer lists were
compiled from various generally known and accessible sources, and thus
were not a trade secret.1 88 As to the marketing plans, the court similarly
pointed out that plaintiffs "marketing information was readily obtainable to
anyone interested in starting an [independent medical examination]
company in Alaska, and [defendant] gained knowledge of such information
during the regular course of her employment.""8 9 Thus, defendant "did not
misappropriate any trade secret because the information she used was
'generally known to the public. 'i90
Similarly, in Utah Medical Products, Inc. v. Clinical Innovations Associates,
Inc. 191 a federal district court case applying the Utah UTSA, the court
dismissed the plaintiffs trade secret misappropriation claim on summary
judgment because the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that its business plans
and strategies possessed sufficient "value."'9 Utah Medical Products, Inc. was
a controversy between a plaintiff, a company that manufactured and sold
medical devices, especially intrauterine catheters, and three of its key
182 See id. at 952-53.
183 Id. at 958.
18 See id.
tas 80 F.3d 1331 (9th Cir. 19%).
186 See id. at 1333.




191 79 F. Supp. 2d. 1290 (D. Utah 1999).
19 See id. at 1313-14.
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employees (its CEO, VP for Research and Development, and Senior Design
Engineer) who left the plaintiff to work for a competitor. The plaintiff
claimed that its former employees and the their new employer
misappropriated its trade secrets. The alleged trade secrets at issue were the
plaintiff's business plan, business strategies, market analysis information,
sales strategy and marketing plan, and marketing work objectives.' The
court first explained that the "generally known or readily ascertainable"
independent economic value "standard cannot be viewed as whether the
information is generally known and readily ascertainable to the general
public, but, based on the defendants' knowledge and experience, whether the
information was known or ascertainable to them."' In the case at bar,
stressed the court, it was "particularly necessary to separate [the claimed trade
secret] from the general skill and knowledge possessed by [the defendant ex-
employees]."'9g The plaintiff, however, failed to meet this burden. "Simply
identifying documents and claiming that they contain trade secret
information is not enough. Plaintiff must establish that the information in
the identified documents is not published or readily ascertainable
information to those in the field." 96 The plaintiff also contended that its
competitor's business plan was a copy of its own trade secret business plan; 9
but the court rejected this assertion too, stating that the plaintiffs
competitor's plan merely discussed "general information" about the purposes
of certain medical devices and various competing devices.'98 Finally, stated
the court: "[f]rom the record of this case, the Court finds it is undisputed
that such information is generally known or readily ascertainable to those in
the industry."' 9 Thus, the defendants were entitled to summary judgment
on the plaintiffs misappropriation of trade secret cause of action.2°
BioCore, Inc. v. Khosrowshahi2°' involved a federal district court case
applying the Kansas UTSA to a trade secret dispute between the plaintiffs,
related medical technology firms, and the defendant, a former high level
executive, who left to work for a competitor. The relevant "value" aspect to
the case was whether the plaintiffs' "sales strategies" for marketing wound
care products rose to the level of legally protected trade secrets. The "sales
strategies" encompassed identifying potential customers and demonstrating
M Set id. at 1311.
19 Id. at 1312.
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the benefits of the product to potential customers; and also were based on
asserted "massive research" to discover potential markets.202 The court
rejected this attempted trade secret designation, however, in part on "value"
grounds. The court found that "[flor makers of wound-care products, the
market is generally known."203 The defendant, moreover, "[b]efore he went
to work for plaintiffs .... recognized the most common wound care markets,
including those for burns, ulcers, and difficult wounds."2 The court further
explained that "a company which markets a medical product would want to
educate customers about the product and demonstrate its effectiveness.
Plaintiffs provide no evidence that their advertising strategy had a modicum
of originality that separated it from others in the field." 20  As to the
purported "massive marketing research", the court ruled that the record did
not support the plaintiffs' claims.206 Specifically, the court noted that
"[p] laintiffs' former salespeople testified that they did not do anything special
in finding customers for plaintiffs' wound care products. They simply used
the phone book, obtained lists from wound care organizations, attended
wound care meetings and sales meetings, and followed up on any leads these
created."207 Thus, the necessary "value" element to a trade secret was lacking.
b. "Value" Present
In the aforementioned Elm City Cheese Co. v. Federico,2' the second
major issue for the Supreme Court of Connecticut to decide was whether
designated information encompassing the plaintifffirm's business operations
and business plan, and all the components thereto, possessed the statutorily
required independent economic value. The court first noted that:
Central to the trial court's ultimate finding that [plaintiff s] business
plan constitutes a trade secret, is the court's finding that [plaintiffs]
business is unique. If the business were not unique - that is, if both
the individual components of [plaintiffs] business plan, and the way
in which those components are combined, were generally known -
M See id. at 1233-34.
2M Id. at 1233.
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[plaintiff] would not be entitled to trade secret protection because its
information would not meet the statutory requirement .... 209
However, in the case at bar, the court did find the necessary unique value
because the plaintiffs cheese manufacturing and sales company occupied a
special place and a specialized niche market in the local industry, possessed
a specialized business which accommodated the special needs of private label
packers, and the firm also possessed a concomitant specialized marketing
plan.210  Moreover, the supreme court utilized an additional, and very
common sense, value factor. That is:
[Defendant] intended to duplicate [plaintiffs] product, using
[plaintiffs] supply sources and customers; and [co-defendant
company's] business plan, which essentially mirrored that of
[plaintiff], gave [co-defendant] an advantage over large
cheesemakers. Indeed, the mere fact that [plaintiffs] plan served as
the basis for [co-defendant's] plan for the purposes of securing loans
to start [co-defendant] supports the proposition that [plaintiffs] plan
had substantial economic value.
2 1
Thus declared the court: "The foregoing demonstrates plainly that
[plaintiff's] trade secret derived independent economic value from not being
generally known to those who could profit from the knowledge of it, that is,
in particular, defendants. 212
The second important issue in Nilssen v. Motorola, Inc.,213 one recalls, was
whether the plaintiff inventor's compilation of non-technical information,
in essence constituting a business plan, possessed value as required by the
state statute. The federal district court first offered some general value
commentary. "[I]nformation that is generally known within an industry is
not trade secret material." 214 "The key.., ease with which information can
be readily duplicated without involving considerable time, effort or
expense."215 Accordingly, continued the court: "significantly, then, Motorola
might prove that [plaintiff inventor's] trade secrets were without value by
demonstrating that those secrets were easily duplicable through proper




213 963 F. Supp. 664 (N.D. I11. 1997).
214 Id. at 675.
21 Id.
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means."216 Whereas, "[t] o have any opportunity to prevail on his Illinois Act
claim, then, [plaintiff] must first prove that his information was sufficiently
secret - in the sense of not being duplicable without 'considerable time,
effort or expense' - to constitute a trade secret." 21 7 In the case at bar, issues
of fact existed, "in both directions" noted the court, as to whether the
plaintiff's alleged non-technical, as well as technical, trade secrets, had value
for Motorola 8 The facts, moreover, were construed by the court in a
favorable, non-moving party, summary judgment fashion, thereby creating
a reasonable inference that plaintiff did have protectable trade secrets of
value.219 Therefore, summaryjudgment for the defendant Motorola on that
basis was inappropriate, "at least for the time being", said the court."0
The federal district court in ALTA Analytics, Inc. v. Muuss,221 a case
decided pursuant to the Ohio version of the Uniform Trade Secret Act, had
no difficulty in declaring that a firm's confidential financial fraud detection
software, including its "unique technology, design, and marketing features"
possessed "independent value. " ' In finding that a legally protected trade
secret existed, the court appeared to give great weight to the testimony of the
plaintiff employer's executives who contended that the firm's "main asset is
its proprietary confidential information in current products and
development" and that "its proprietary information is responsible for its
competitive edge in the market." '
In All Pro Sports Camp, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co.,z24 a Florida appellate case,
the court offered a "novelty" test to address the value requirement.25 All Pro
Sports, Inc. involved a dispute between a company that developed multi-sport
theme park facilities and the Walt Disney company. The plaintiff
corporation, All Pro, created an idea and detailed business plans, including
architectural sketches and model, for a "Sports Island" facility, encompassing
integrated education and entertainment components. This idea was
submitted as a confidential proposal to defendant Disney corporation for
consideration. 6 Plaintiff All Pro subsequently learned that Disney was
planning to develop its own facility using the business plans previously
216 Id.
217 Id.
210 Set id. at 679.
219 See id.
2'D See id.
221 75 F. Supp. 2d. 773 (S.D. Ohio 1999).
" Id. at 785.
Id.
224 727 So. 2d 363 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999).
2Z Set id. at 367.
226 See id. at 364.
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submitted by All Pro.27 Whereupon, All Pro sued Disney, contending that
plaintiff's business plans constituted "valuable trade secrets" which Disney
was seeking to misappropriate." The lower court dismissed All Pro's
complaint, in relevant part because the idea of the sports park facility was not
a trade secret. 9 The appellate court ruled that an idea, to constitute a trade
secret, "must exhibit some novelty to derive economic value from not being
generally known."2- Such an issue, in addition, is a factual issue for the
jury- ' The court did note the "asserted widespread existence of multi-
purpose sports complexes," but held that this fact "fails to conclusively
demonstrate that all Pro's concept for Sports Island is not novel." 2
Moreover, the court asserted, "[a]rguably, it is also common knowledge, if
not common sense, that all sports complexes are not alike. Thus, the concept
behind Sports Island may not in fact, be ""generally known to... other
persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use.
Accordingly, the appellate court ruled that the lower court had prematurely
determined that All Pro could never establish a trade secret cause of action,
and reversed the order of dismissal on the trade secret counts.'
Cardinal Freight Carriers, Inc. v. J.B. Hunt Transport Services, Inc. s' is a
Supreme Court of Arkansas case which applied the state's trade secret act.
The case involved a trade secret dispute between two trucking firms. Two
key employees of one firm, who were hired to develop customized
transportation and distribution systems, left the firm to work for a
competitor. 6 The former employer, plaintiff/appellee, sought injunctive
relief, and contended that certain business information, including its
marketing programs and future plans, its "strategic planning for the future,"
and "how [it] intends to attack certain markets with specific customers" were
legally protected trade secrets pursuant to state statute. 37 The new employer
and ex-employees, defendants/appellants, however, asserted that the
information possessed by the former employees was "generally known to
others in the trucking industry, or readily ascertainable by proper means,"
2 See id. at 367.
229 See id. at 364.
22 See id. at 365.
2M Id. at 367.
231 See id. at 368.
2~2 Id.
23 Id. (citations omitted).
Z4 See id.
235 987 S.W.2d 642 (Ark. 1999).
M Id. at 643.
=7 Id. at 644-45.
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and consequently not a trade secret."3  To bolster their defense, the
defendants' expert witness, an "independent transportation consultant,"
expressed his belief that "there are no meaningful secrets in the trucking
business," and that at least some information "can generally be ascertained
from a variety of legitimate sources and trade journals." 39 The former
employer's chief executive officer, however, "testified how [its] trade secrets
derived economic value by keeping confidential information bearing on price
modeling, customer profit margins, logistics, future plans, and specific
market strategies." ' The court emphasized that "[o]bviously, armed with
such information, a competitor would have an edge in capturing some
significant part of [former employer's] customers and business."241 The
court ruled, therefore, that "[i]n sum, we harbor no doubts" that the
information was protected by the state trade secret statute.242
The presence of statutorily required value was one of the two key trade
secret issues in Motor City Bagels, L.L.C. v. American Bagel Co.,243 a federal
district court case applying Virginia and Maryland trade secret statutes, both
of which according to the court, "closely track" the UTSA.24 Motor City
Bagels, L.L.C. concerned two plaintiffs, both of whom possessed a M.B.A.
and substantial business experience, who wished to be bagel franchisees.24
Accordingly, the plaintiffs developed, what the court termed, "an extensive,
written business plan analyzing the viability of owning and operating [bagel]
franchises."24 The business plan was distributed to several prospective
franchisors for confidential evaluation, but the plaintiffs contended their
business plan was misappropriated in contravention of state trade secret
law.24v After first stating the standard UTSA definition of a trade secret, the
court first focused in on the value requirement in the statutory definition.24
The court then considered state "marketing plan" precedent which
maintained that if a plan is based on information readily available in the
marketplace, or information obtained "simply by talking with prospective
customers," the plan lacks value.249 However, in the case at bar, "[w]hile the
238 Id.
M9 Id. at 646.
240 Id. at 645.
24 Id. at 646.
242 Id.
243 50 F. Supp. 2d. 460 (D. Md. 1999).
244 See id. at 478.
245 See id. at 465-66.
246 Id. at 466.
247 See id. at 467.
248 See id. at 477-78.
249 Id. at 478-79 (quoting Optic Graphics, Inc. v. Agee, 591 A.2d 578 (Md. 1991).
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business plan at issue .. does contain some public information and facts
ascertainable from the marketplace, it likewise includes personal insights and
analysis brought to bear through diligent research and by marshalling a large
volume of information.""0 The next value question for the court to resolve
was whether the compilation of information in the plan, some of which was
available to the general public, would defeat the plaintiffs' value case.2"' The
court again referred to precedent, federal and state, which held that a
collection of information, including individual publicly known pieces,
nonetheless can possess value if "combined in a unique way" or the
"compilation or collection in a single place or in a particular form ... is of
value." 2 2 That is, a combination of information can be the predicate for a
trade secret, "as long as the combination is itself a secret. "2 3 The court,
therefore, applied the rules and rationales expressed in those decisions, and
concluded that "the plaintiffs' extensive compilation of information and
analysis in their business plan qualifies as a trade secret."2
Religious Technology Center v. Netcom On-Line Communications Services,
Inc. ," one recalls, stands in part for the proposition that the writings of the
founder of a religion can come under the "information" standard to the
UTSA's definition of a trade secret. The next issue for the court to resolve
was whether that "information" - the religious writings - possessed the
statutorily required "independent economic value." 6 Again, referring back
to the original Restatement, the court stated that "[a] trade secret must have
sufficient value in the owner's operation of its enterprise such that it provides
an actual or potential advantage over others who do not possess the
information." 27 The court thereupon reviewed the evidence and found that
the information did possess sufficient value.2"' Specifically, the court pointed
out that the information was a source of substantial revenue for the Church
by means of licensing fees, the Church needed such revenue to support itself,
and, finally, that several "breakaway Scientology-like groups" have been
"exploiting... [the] works for profit," thus demonstrating that "these works
give the Church a comparative advantage." 2 9 Since the works did possess
250 Id. at 479.
251 See id.
252 Id.
2s3 Id. (quoting Comprehensive Tech., Inc. v. Software Artisans, Inc., 3 F.3d 730,736 (4th Cir.
1993)).
2 Id.
s 923 F. Supp. 1231 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
25 See id. at 1252.
25 Id. at 1252-53.
Z8 See id. at 1253.
259 Id.
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value, the final trade secret factor for the court to ascertain was the "secrecy"
requirement.
3. THE "SECRECY" REQUREMENT
Trade secret legal protection under the UTSA is conditioned on the
owner's implementing reasonable measures to maintain the secrecy of the
valuable information. The following cases examine the crucial "secrecy"
criterion to a trade secret.
a. "Secrecy" Not Found
260Alagold Corp. v. Freeman, one recalls, involved an attempt by the former
employer to classify knowledge and expertise of how to develop business
strategies, market products, and develop relationships with customers and
suppliers, inter alia, as trade secrets pursuant to the Alabama version of the
Uniform Trade Secret Act. The dispositive issue was whether the former
employer took the statutorily required "reasonable" efforts to ensure the
secrecy of the information.26' The plaintiff, the former employer, contended
that the information taken by its former employee, the executive vice-
president of the corporation and general manager of one of its divisions, was
adequately protected.2" Specifically, the former employer argued that the
information was not freely accessible to all employees at the firm, but rather
was available on a "need-to-know" basis. Moreover, the information was
maintained in designated file cabinets in the administrative offices, where
only employees who require such information are permitted access.26
Finally, these offices were locked after regular business hours. 2" The court,
however, found some "problems" to be present with the plaintiffs
"purported" secrecy efforts.26s Apparently, the plaintiffs employees had too
free access to the information, because none of the filing cabinets containing
such information were locked, the information was not designated as
"confidential," and the plaintiff failed to communicate to its employees that
such "proprietary" information was to be kept confidential. 266 An additional
and very important secrecy factor for the court evaluation's of plaintiffs
26 20 F. Supp. 2d. 1305, 1309-10 (M.D. Ala. 1998).
261 See id. at 1315-16.
26 See id. at 1315.
20 See id.
2M See id.
2 See id. at 1316.
Se, id. at 1315.
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efforts to maintain the secrecy of confidential information was the absence
of any confidentiality or non-compete agreement. 67 The court underscored
that the plaintiff, the former corporate employer,
Which employed [defendant ex-employee] as an Executive Vice
President and General Manager of a products division and gave him
full access to all of [plaintiffs] confidential information, did not
require [defendant] to execute a confidentiality or non-compete
agreement limiting the use of information (defendant] learned
during his employment with [plaintiff].2'
Consequently, the court declared that "[g]iven these facts, it cannot be said
that [plaintiff] undertook reasonable efforts under the circumstances to
maintain the secrecy of its information."26 Since the plaintiff failed to satisfy
its burden of establishing that the information was a trade secret, the
information thus was not entitled to protection under Alabama's Trade
Secrets Act.27°
Lexis-Nexis v. Beer2" is another federal district case administering
Minnesota's UTSA. The aforementioned case involved a dispute between
one of the largest electronic data services companies in the world and one of
its former salespersons, who left to work for a competitor and there to
perform substantially the same duties. The plaintiffcompany contended that
certain sensitive company documents, including sales strategies and policies,
imparted to the former employee were misappropriated trade secrets subject
to injunctive relief 2 The "hotly contested" question arose as to whether the
plaintiff had exercised reasonable efforts to maintain secrecy of the
information. 3 The plaintiff asserted that it had maintained a formal policy
concerning the confidentiality of the sales strategies and policies as well as
other sensitive information.274 The defendant, however, produced evidence,
through the deposition testimony of the plaintiffs own employees, that the
plaintiffs confidentiality policies were "frequently disregarded in practice."27s
Moreover, as the court emphasized, "[ilndeed,... many of the documents
267 See id. at 1315-16.
/W Id.
2 Id. at 1316.
2M0 See id.
271 41 F. Supp. 2d. 950 (D. Minn. 1999).
z7 See id. at 952-53.
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that [plaintiff] has submitted as evidence oftrade secrets are not labeled with
the 'Lexis-Nexis Confidential and Proprietary' mark required by company
policy."27 6 Finally, the court pointed out that "even after [plaintiff] brought
this litigation, [it] continued to mail allegedly confidential documents to
[defendant]." 27' The court, therefore, could not make a specific finding that
the pertinent information was a trade secret, and consequently denied the
plaintiffs petition for an injunction.27'
The second major trade secret issue in the previously examined Motor
City Bagels, L.L. C. v. American Bagel Co.r2s was whether the plaintiffs' business
plan to enter the bagel franchise market, which definitely possessed sufficient
value said the court, was adequately keep secret. The court first stated the
basic requirement that "plaintiffs must prove .. . they took reasonable
measures to ensure the secrecy of their business plan."28 ° The evidence
indicated that the plaintiffs had the "most potential investors" sign a copy of
a confidentiality agreement when they received a copy of the plan.211 Most
however, is not all; and thus "[t] he problem for the plaintiffs is that they only
produced five executed copies of the confidentiality agreement when they
distributed the business plan to over fifteen individuals." 28 2 This "problem"
amounted to a huge one for the plaintiffs when the federal district court
pointed to a U.S. Supreme Court pronouncement that the disclosure of an
alleged trade secret "to others who are under no obligation to protect the
confidentiality of the information" extinguishes the "property right" in the
disclosure.2 3 Consequently, "[u] nder this reasoning, the plaintiffs' failure to
exact agreements from potential investors to maintain the secrecy of the
business plan is inconsistent with recognition of the document as a trade
secret.. .24 The plaintiffs finally attempted to save their secrecy case by
pointing to the confidential and cautionary language appearing on their
business plan. The court, however, deemed the language to be mere
"boilerplate," as well as "not highlighted or isolated so as to put one on
immediate notice that the plan constitutes a trade secret that the authors of
the plan are actively seeking to protect." 28 1 "Taking the facts as a whole," the
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to ensure the secrecy of their plan."" 6 Thus, since the plaintiffs failed to
produce sufficient proof on this "essential" secrecy element to their
misappropriation claim, the court dismissed that count on the defendants'
motion for summary judgment.2"
In the aforementioned BioCore v. Izosrowshahi 8 case, dealing in
pertinent part with the issue of whether "sales strategies" for wound care
products were trade secrets, the court summarily disposed of the trade secret
allegation on secrecy grounds. The court succinctly stated that "plaintiffs
disclosed these strategies in their marketing materials, which both attempted
to educate their customers and demonstrate the effectiveness of their product
.... These strategies are therefore not trade secrets; plaintiffs did not attempt
to keep them secret."
219
b. "Secrecy" Present
In ALTA Analytics Inc. v. Muuss,2 the court ruled that the plaintiff
employer had taken "significant precautions" to protect its valuable
proprietary information, which included the "marketing features" offinancial
fraud detection software; but apparently only by securing confidentiality
agreements with its employees and by "regularly" engaging in such
agreements with potential customers upon receipt of trial software. 29' The
court thus held that a trade secret existed and enjoined the defendant former
employee, an account representative, from working for the former
employer's direct competitor for one year.
2
The second major trade secret issue in Cardinal Freight Carriers, Inc. v.J.B.
Hunt Transport Services, Inc.293 was whether the former employer had taken
reasonable steps to maintain the secrecy of the information, which included
future plans and strategies and marketing plans and strategies.294 The
Arkansas Supreme Court related at length that the CEO of the former
employer:
[SI aid that the confidential agreement [it] requires employees to sign
is one way it assures its trade secrets are not passed on to others. It is
2M Id.
W7 See id.
" 96 F. Supp. 2d. 1221, 1234 (D. Kan. 2000).
2 Id.
29 75 F. Supp. 2d. 773 (S.D. Ohio 1999).
291 See id. at 785.
2 See id. at 786.
~' 987 S.W.2d 642,646 (Ark 1999).
291 See id.
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significant, too, that [former employer's] agreement limits its
employees from disclosing [its] information for a period of one year,
which seems patently reasonable for the type of trade secrets covered
.... [The CEO of former employer] also testified that [it] issues
passwords and pass codes to employees who are privy to trade secret
information in order to prevent the releasing of such information.
Finally, [CEO] said that the [former employer] maintains trade-
secret information by the employment of a 'loose-lips' policy, which
is well known to everyone at [former employer] and permits only
two [company] personnel to talk to the media.' s
Accordingly, the court ruled that these measures were "reasonable," and thus
the trade secret information was subject to protection by injunction. 6
La Caihene v. Spolya,97 is a federal district court case using the Minnesota
UTSA principally to determine whether "strategic and marketing plans" were
reasonably protected in compliance with the state statute. The controversy
arose between the plaintiff, a company in the business of selling isolator
products and technology used to contain hazardous waste in the
pharmaceutical industry, the defendant, its former chief operating officer and
president of its sales and marketing division. 29 The defendant resigned from
the plaintiffto work as a salesperson for a direct competitor. The plaintiffs
main contention was that its "strategic and marketing plans" were subject to
protection as trade secrets. 3" The defendant countered by asserting that the
information at issue did not meet the statutory definition of a trade secret
because the plaintiff made "inadequate efforts to maintain its secrecy. "3°'
The court, however, concluded that the steps the plaintiff took were
"reasonable under the circumstances."302 Specifically, the court mentioned
the following protective measures: restricting the number of people who had
access to the confidential information; not permitting visitors to move
through the plant building without escort; and requiring plaintiff and other
high ranking employees to sign confidentiality agreements.303 Finally, the
court emphasized that "the initiation and execution ofa confidentiality policy
fell within defendant's area of responsibility, as chief operating officer. It
2% Id.
2 See id. at 646-47.
2 938 F. Supp. 523 (W.D. Wis. 1996).
2 Seeid. at 524.
2W See id. at 526.
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would be. ironic, and unfair to plaintiff, if defendant's failure to take proper
measures to protect plaintiffs confidential information and knowledge base
inured to his benefit."' Since the threat of misappropriation of the strategic
and marketing plans, as well as other information, was "very real" and "all but
inevitable," the court granted the requested preliminary injunction.
3
05
In the previously discussed Elm City Cheese Co.. v. Federico,3' 6 the third
major issue for the Supreme Court of Connecticut to decide was whether
designated information, possessing value, encompassing the plaintiff firm's
business operations and business plan, and all the components thereto, was
adequately protected in accordance with statutory UTSA requirements.
3 7
The court first provided some general secrecy comments:
The question of whether, in a specific case, a party has made
reasonable efforts to maintain the secrecy of a purported trade secret
is by nature a highly fact-specific inquiry. What may be adequate
under the peculiar facts of one case might be considered inadequate
under the facts of another. According to [statute], the efforts need
only be 'reasonable under the circumstances . .. "8
In the specific case confronting the court, the defendants (the former key,
trusted employee and family friend, and the personal and business
accountant, one recalls, and an incipient competing firm) contended that
secrecy was lacking because the plaintiff had no confidentiality agreements
with its employees, its written employee manuals made no mention of
confidentiality or nondisclosure policies or guidelines, and most employees
of the firm had become familiar with all aspects of the manufacturing process
and the identity of customers and suppliers. The court, however, after first
underscoring that the firm's "entire business plan," not merely its
manufacturing processes, was the trade secret at issue, concluded that "so
long as [plaintiff] kept confidential enough information to make it virtually
impossible for its employees to use the rest of the information constituting
its trade secret, a trier of fact reasonably could find that, under the
circumstances, its methods of maintaining secrecy complied with the
demands of the statute."3 1' The court noted the specific finding of the trial
xx Id.
3M See id. at 531-32.
X 752A.2d 1037 (Conn. 1999).
3M See id. at 1050.
W Id. (citations omitted).
See id.
310 Id. at 1050-51.
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court that the employees, other than the defendant, did not have "sufficient
exposure to all the integral parts of [plaintiff's] business to go out and
compete." 3 ' The court also related that the trial court found that all the
sensitive information was kept confidential and only shared among family
members.312 The failure of the plaintiff company to secure a confidentiality
and non-disclosure agreement, however, did emerge as a problematic factor
for the state high court; but such a failure, the court ruled, was not "fatal" to
plaintiff's trade secret claim.313 The court explained its reasoning at length:
[I]n light of the close personal relationship enjoyed over the years by
the [family corporate principals] and [defendant], it was reasonable
for [plaintiff company] to assume it had nothing to fear from
[defendant] in the way of misappropriation of its cheesemaking
process or its business information and, therefore, [plaintiff's]
decision not to take affirmative steps to ensure the secrecy of its
information with respect to [defendant] constituted 'reasonable
efforts under the circumstances.' Moreover, we conclude that, in
light of the confidential nature of a certified public accountant's
relationship with his or her client, [plaintiff] was not required to
obtain from [defendant] a written statement o the order of an
agreement pertaining to confidentiality, nondisclosure or
noncompetition. Rather, such an agreement was implicit in the
relationship between the parties, and [plaintiff) was entitled to rely
on it.
31 4
The court consequently ruled for the plaintiff on the final secrecy trade
secret element.35 The court nonetheless enunciated a stem warning as to any
laxness in security measures taken by prospective trade secret owners. The
court counseled:
We emphasize that nothing in this opinion should be read to
diminish the importance of taking precautionary measures - for
example, requiring employees to sign confidentiality agreements,
segregating duties, restricting visitor access, or other appropriate
measures - in order to satisfy the statutorily mandated secrecy
requirement . . . , nor should our conclusion be construed as
31 Id. at 1051.
312 See id.
313 See id.
M4 Id. at 1052-53.
315 See id. at 1053.
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encouraging proprietors to be lax in their protection of the secrecy
of information they want to be considered protectable trade secrets.
Rather, our conclusion is merely a reflection of the unique factual
circumstances that gave rise to this case.316
The final trade secret issue in the aforementioned Religious Technology
Center v. Netcom On-Line Communications Services, inc.317 was whether the
Church of Scientology and its affiliated organizations took the statutorily
required "reasonable" efforts to maintain the secrecy of the writings of its
founder.31 The court initially explained generally that "'[r]easonable efforts'
can include advising employees of the existence of a trade secret, limiting
access to information on a 'need to know basis,' ... requiring employees to
sign confidentiality agreements,... and keeping secret documents under
lock-"319  In the case at bar, the court indicated that the Church's
representative described the "elaborate means" used to ensure the
confidentiality of the works.32° Specifically, the court noted "the use of
locked cabinets, safes, logging and identification of materials, availability of
materials at only a handful of sites worldwide, electronic sensors attached to
the documents, locked briefcases for transporting works, alarms, photo
identifications, security personnel, and confidentiality agreements for all of
those given access to the materials."32' Accordingly, the court ruled that
"[t]he Church has made more than an adequate showing on this [secrecy]
issue. ' 322 In summary, the writings of the founder of the Church of
Scientology were trade secret information, possessing value, and more than
"reasonably" kept secret. Yet, the federal district court denied the Church's
request for preliminary injunctive relief. The court stated that "parts of many
of the works have been mentioned in various published articles and
books .. ."; and, apparently, the Church failed to delineate precisely what
writings and works were truly its asserted protectable trade secrets.3" Thus
concluded the court "these issues will have to be resolved before [the
Church] can ultimately prevail on its trade secret claims. 324
316 Id.
317 923 F. Supp. 1231 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
318 See id. at 1253.
319 Id.
3D See id. at 1253-54.
321 Id. at 1254.
322 Id.
323 See id. at 1257.
324 Id.
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Bagley v. Lumbernens Mutual Casualty Co.325 is inserted in the analysis
herein mainly to make a procedural secrecy point. In Bagley, the plaintiffwas
the holder of a M.BAJ.D., and LL.M., who had over a decade of experience
in the insurance industry. The plaintiff contended that the defendant
Kemper Insurance Group, to whom he showed his business plan, a proposed
"Barrister Protection Policy," misappropriated his business plan.326
Defendant Kemper asserted that the essence of the plan was the marketing
of insurance to a niche market, which was generally known in the industry;
and, moreover, that the plan was not confidential.32 The evidence did in fact
indicate that the plaintiff failed to secure a confidentiality agreement with the
defendant, and also that the plaintiff had shared his business plan with
another industry expert.28 Yet, this trade secret misappropriation
controversy arose in the context of a summaryjudgment motion to dismiss.
The federal district court relied on Seventh Circuit authority, which stated
that the "secrecy" issue should not be resolved as a matter of law on summary
judgment except in "extreme cases"; and the district court consequently held
that " [t ]his is not an extreme case", thus denying defendant Kemper's motion
to dismiss the trade secret misappropriation count.329
D. Conclusion
Trade secrets, together with patents, copyrights, and trademarks,
compose a larger corpus of intellectual property law. Patents, copyrights, and
trademarks, one recalls, provide the owner thereof with a legal ownership
interest and the concomitant right to exclusive use, sale, or licensure. This
right, it is important to note, does not depend on maintaining the secrecy of
the information. Ownership of. a trade secret, however, does not confer a
right of exclusive use; rather, the owner of the trade secret possesses the right
not to have the protected information stolen, misappropriated, or wrongfully
acquired by others.
Information, of course, in the form of business plans and strategies, must
rise to the level of legally recognized "information." A compilation or
combination of information indeed can rise to the level of a trade secret, even
if the components are deemed "general" or "public" elements, if the
integration is unique and advantageous. If, however, information is
construed as mere public knowledge, or general knowledge or skill, it cannot
m 100 F. Supp. 2d. 879 (N.D. 111. 2000).
n6 See id. at 883-84.
3V See id. at 884.
323 See id.
M See id.
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form the predicate for a legal trade secret. The law is clear, both the common
law and the UTSA, that trade secret law should not unduly impede former
employees from utilizing certain types of information at another job.
Moreover, if a business plan or strategy is, or becomes, widely known, or is
readily ascertainable or available by proper means, the information ceases to
be a protected trade secret, as it lacks the requisite value.
Value of course, is an indispensable trade secret element. If an idea,
concept, design, plan, or strategy is so common or widely known, or known,
easily generated, or readily ascertainable by competent people in the
particular field, it lacks value, and thus is not legally cognizable as a trade
secret. Value will be found when the business plan or strategy is sufficiently
novel, unique, or original, so that it confers an economic advantage to the
holder thereof. Note, however, that although a few cases do explicitly
employ a "novelty" test, the level of novelty does not appear to be as high as
that required in patent law; rather, "novelty" should be construed in the
context of value, especially the requirement that the information be not
readily ascertainable to competitors in the industry.
Information, finally, in the form of business plans and strategies, in order
to meet the legal definition of a UTSA trade secret, not only must be a truly
valuable secret, but the professed owner thereof must implement reasonable
measures to preserve its secrecy. Secrecy, of course, need not be absolute, but
rather "reasonable" under the circumstances of the particular case.
Accordingly, the secrecy measures do not have to be extreme or unduly
expensive or burdensome. Naturally, scant or inadequate precautions in
guarding the secrecy of a business plan or strategy will cause the loss of legal
protection. However, if the possessor of such information does act
accordingly, and meets the secrecy conditions of the law, trade secret law, in
essence, will permit a theoretically perpetual monopoly on certain
information to endure. Yet,
This lack of a fixed duration for protection creates both risk and
opportunity. Trade secret protection theoretically can last forever,
providing the prospect of long-term competitive advantage.
However, the holder constantly faces the uncertainty of sudden loss
of rights through disclosure, which can occur at any time through
the failure of the holder's 'reasonable efforts' programs or third party
actions.33
3W Chiappetta, supra note 77, at 78.
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It is interesting to note that when there is some evidence of secrecy
measures, as well as the existence ofa confidential relationship, the courts are
disinclined, and rightly so, to deny trade secret protection on the grounds of
inadequate security. What the courts appear to be doing is to balance the
behavior of the owner of the trade secret against the conduct of the person
obtaining the business plan or strategy. This secrecy balancing is in accord
with the overall goals of trade secret law, both the common law, and the
UTSA: that is, to balance the former employer's need for legal protection for
certain information, with the former employee's need to utilize certain
knowledge and advance oneself; and also to balance the public interest in
encouraging invention, innovation, entrepreneurship, and competition, with
the public interest in establishing and maintaining business ethics and fair
commercial practices.
IV. THE COMMON LAW - THE RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
UNFAIR CoMPETITION
A. Introduction
In 1979, surprisingly, trade secret law was omitted as part of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts. However, finally, in 1995, the Restatement (Third)
of Unfair Competition was promulgated by the American Law Institute;331 and
trade secret lawwas included in Sections 39-45 and accompanying comments
and notes, as a new part to the corpus of "unfair competition" law.332 The new
Restatement discusses the relationship between trade secret law and federal
patent and copyright law. It initially notes the Supreme Court's Kewanee Oil
Co. decision, holding that federal patent law does not preempt state trade
secret law, and also notes that "protection afforded to trade secrets ... has
been held to lie outside the preemptive scope of the Copyright Act." 333 One
recalls from the UTSA case law that occasionally the courts interpose a
"novelty" test, apparently borrowed from patent law, to trade secret disputes.
The newRestatement directly addresses this novelty question, maintaining that
"[niovelty in the patent sense is not required."334 Rather, "[a]lthough trade
secret cases sometimes announce a 'novelty' requirement, the concept is
331 See Pooley, supra note 23, at 1188.
332- See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPErITION SS 39-45 (1995); Pooley, supra note
23, at 1188.
3M RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION S 39 cmt. c (1995).
334 See id. cmt. f.
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synonymous with the concepts of secrecy and value... " of trade secret
law.
335
B. Overview of the Restatement
The Restatement broadly defines a trade secret as "any information that can
be used in the operation of a business or other enterprise and that is
sufficiently valuable and secret to afford an actual or potential economic
advantage over others." 336 The definition thus tracks the common law and
UTSA, both in form and substance, particularly in that the fundamental
trade secret elements of information, value, and secrecy are firmly
established. The Restatement then discusses at length the rationales for legal
protection, underscoring the need to develop standards for "fair
competition," to protect a plaintiff from unfair competition, to encourage
investment in research, to promote the efficient exploitation of knowledge,
and to safeguard against breaches of confidence and violations of privacy.
3 37
The question as to whether certain information is a trade secret is properly
regarded as a question of fact to be decided by the jury or judge as fact-
finder.338
As to the information predicate for a trade secret, which the Restatement
titles "subject matter," the new Restatement's meaning to information tracks
the UTSA definition, but also includes "other form[s] or embodiment[s] of
economically valuable information.3 39 A plaintiff asserting trade secret rights
to certain information bears the burden of defining the information with
sufficient definiteness so as to allow a court to apply the criteria for legal
protection. 310 In addition, when ascertaining whether information is legally
adequate information the Restatement relates that:
[tihe degree of definiteness required in a particular case is .
properly influenced by the legitimate interests of the defendant.
Thus, a court may require greater specificity when the plaintiffs
claim involves information that is closely integrated with the general
skill and knowledge that is properly retained by former employees.m'
335 Id. cmt. f. (Reporter's notes).
36 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION S 39 at 425 (1995).
33 See id. cmt. a.
3M See id. cmt. d (Reporter's notes).
339 Id. cmnt. d.
340 See id.
341 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION S 39 cmt. d (1995).
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Regarding the value requirement, the Restatement again follows the "actual
or potential economic advantage" delineation of the UTSA.42 The
Restatement adds, however, that "[t]he advantage... need not be great.""M'
Yet, it must be "more than trivial."3" The Restatement then discusses how the
necessary "value" can be established by direct and circumstantial evidence,
pointing out that the use of a trade secret in the operation of one's business
is in itself "some" evidence of value.34s Finally, the Restatement echoes the
UTSA in that "negative information" can possess value.
34
The last trade secret requirement, secrecy, is discussed and illustrated at
length in the new Restatement. Again, the Restatement restates initially the
conventional rules that information must be in fact secret, but the secrecy
need not be absolute.' 47 Rather, "the requirement of secrecy is satisfied if it
would be difficult or costly for others who could exploit the information to
acquire it without resort to the wrongful conduct proscribed . . .348
Confidential disclosures of information, and even certain limited non-
confidential disclosures, explains the Restatement, will not destroy trade secret
protection. 4 9 The Restatement, finally, provides a list of some of the "many
forms" of relevant precautionary measures to maintain secrecy, yet concludes
by simply restating the UTSA's "reasonableness" test.5
According to the new Restatement, one can be subject to liability for the
appropriation of another's trade secret if one acquires the trade secret by
improper means, and one knows or should know that the information is a
trade secret.'5 ' Moreover, wrongful appropriation can occur if one uses or
discloses a trade secret without consent, by improper means, or in
contravention of a duty of confidence.35 2 The plaintiff, of course, bears the
burden, not only of demonstrating the existence of the trade secret, but also
of proving that a misappropriation thereof transpired.353
The Restatement underscores the injunction as a remedy available for trade
secret misappropriation, but nonetheless counsels that absent an enforceable









351 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION S 40 (1995).
2 See id.
3 See id. cmt. a.
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restrictive covenant, a court ordinarily will not prevent an employee who has
knowledge of a former employer's trade secrets from engaging in a particular
business or working for a competitor, unless there is "clear evidence" that the
contemplated employment will result in disclosure of the secret.3
Moreover, if there is a "substantial risk" of disclosure, the injunction should
be narrowly tailored to prohibit disclosure or to prohibit the employee's
participation in a certain project that presents a special risk of disclosure.
355
C. "Plans and Strategies" Case Law
In the subject matter, that is, the information predicate comment section,
the new Restatement, although enumerating various types of technical and
scientific type information, does explicitly state that "[a] trade secret can also
relate to other aspects of business operations such as . . . marketing
techniques ... ."3-6 Moreover, in the Reporter's Notes section, the
Restatement echoes the UTSA by including "marketing plans" case law under
the protected "eligible" "information" category.35 Yet, the cases cited in the
new Restatement are older UTSA and common law cases; and, surprisingly,
the research for this article did not yield any current cases citing the "new"
1995 Restatement as "business plans and strategies" trade secret authority.
D. Conclusion
This "new" Restatement and the trade secret definition and formulation
therein appears to be mainly in conformity with the common law and
UTSA. "However, as individual state's enactments and interpretations of the
UTSA diverge over time, the decreasing 'uniformity' of the Uniform Act
may cause greater reliance on the 'new Restatement' language."3 8 Yet,
despite all the voluminous new Restatement language, explication, and
examples, the Restatement itself warns:
It is not possible to state precise criteria for the determining the
existence of a trade secret. The status of information claimed as a
trade secret must be ascertained through a comparative evaluation of
3u See id.
11 See id.
3 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION S 39 cmt. d (1995).
37 See id. cmt. d (Reporter's Notes).
3s0 Pooley, supra note 4, at 624.
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all the relevant factors, including the value, secrecy, and definiteness
of the information as well as the nature of the defendant's conduct.5 9
The state common law and statutory law, and compendiums thereof,
previously examined all imposed civil penalties for the misappropriation of
a trade secret. Now, it is imperative to examine succinctly but also to
underscore a new federal statute that imposes criminal penalties for the
misappropriation of a trade secret.
V. FEDERAL STATUTE - THE ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE ACT
A. Introduction
Information theft or "leakage" recently has emerged as a very serious
problem for United States business and industry."6 Of course, there always
have been varying state statutes which made criminal the theft of trade
secrets.36' However, "[s]tate laws have been spotty in their existence and
have been spotty in their enforcement."3 62 Moreover, "these state laws have
not been effective, primarily because the resources needed to prosecute trade
secret cases are usually not available at the state government level." 36 Even
though the UTSA does provide for extensive damages, the damages are only
civil; and thus:
Many of the businesses engaging in these offenses view the potential
damages as a necessary risk, the cost of doing business, and a way to
gain an economic advantage over competitors. In other words, for
many companies and individuals involved in stealing competitors'
secrets, the penalties are not a deterrent.3 4
Finally, an aggrieved firm might have to wait years to resolve a trade
secret dispute through civil litigation.36 Yet until quite recently, there was
no federal law in the United States that explicitly governed the theft of trade
secrets. The result has been the absence of a serious criminal deterrent to the
359 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION S 39 cmt. d (1995).
3W See Pooley, supra note 23, at 1181 (reporting that information losses are between $5 and $10
billion a year).
361 See Pooley, supra note 4, at 629.
3Q Pooley, supra note 23, at 1187.
36 Desmet, supra note 8, at 102 (detailing the examination and comparative analysis ofthe statute).
Y Id. at 105-06.
36 See id. at 107.
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theft of trade secrets. In 1996, however, Congress promulgated the Economic
Espionage Act (EEA) which makes criminal on the federal level the theft of
trade secrets. The Act "reflects Congress's recognition of the need to protect
U.S. technology from unethical business competition. The EEA does so by
providing severe criminal penalties for those prosecuted under its
provisions."366 The Act, in addition, "was needed to provide stronger
deterrent and to address the modem concerns of instant communication, a
decrease in employer loyalty, a shift from an economy based on
manufacturing to one based on intellectual property, and a shift of espionage
resources by foreign countries to economic targets."367 The BEA recently has
been upheld constitutionally by a federal district court against allegations that
the statute was vague, overly broad, and infringed on First Amendment
rights.368
The EEA contains two very important provisions. 69 The first is aimed
at foreign industrial espionage and requires that the theft of the trade secret
be accomplished to benefit a foreign government, instrumentality, or
agent.370 The second renders criminal the more typical business theft of trade
secrets, regardless of who benefits.37' Clearly indicating the far more serious
aspect of foreign espionage, a person convicted of violating § 1831 faces
imprisonment up to fifteen years and a fine of $500,000 or both,372 while a
person convicted of violating § 1832 "only" faces up to ten years
imprisonment and a fine of $500,000 or both.373 The EEA also includes a
provision for the criminal forfeiture of any property and proceeds obtained
by means of a violation of the Act,374 as well as a provision for a civil action
for injunctive relief.37s These stringent provisions legally "enhance the trade
secret holder's arsenal." 376
B. Overview of the Economic Espionage Act
Pursuant to both EEA sections, the government first must establish by
proof beyond a reasonable doubt that certain information is a statutorily
3" Id. at 94.
37 Id. at 106-07.
3M See United States v. Hsu, 40 F. Supp. 2d. 623,627-28 (E.D. Pa. 1999).
39 See Desmet, supra note 8, at 109-15 (providing a detailed analysis of the statute).
370 See 18 U.S.C. S 1831 (2000).
371 See 18 U.S.C. S 1832 (2000).
372 See 18 U.S.C. S 1831(a)(5) (2000).
373 See 18 U.S.C. S 1832(a)(5) (2000).
374 See 18 U.S.C. S 1834 (2000).
37 See 18 U.S.C. S 1836(a) (2000).
376 See Chiappetta, supra note 77, at 72.
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defined trade secret, the defendant knew this information was a trade secret,
and the defendant stole it or obtained or conveyed it without the
authorization of the owner.3 " To constitute a § 1831 espionage violation, the
government also must prove that the theft would benefit or was intended to
benefit a foreign government, instrumentality, or agent.378  If the
government, however, is unable to establish the foreign government
connection, the government still can establish an EEA violation under § 1832
by demonstrating that the defendant intended to convert the trade secret to
the economic benefit of anyone other than the owner, the defendant knew
or intended that the owner of the trade secret would be harmed, and that an
adequate connection to interstate or foreign commerce existed.379
Ascertaining whether certain information is a trade secret is an
indispensable EEA finding. The EEA definition of a trade secret, however,
is very broad. Trade secrets generally include all types of information which
the owner has taken reasonable measures to keep secret and which possess
independent economic value, actual or potential, because it is not generally
known to, and readily ascertainable through proper means by, the public.80
Specifically, the information capable of EEA protection encompasses "all
forms and types of financial, business, scientific, technical, economic or
engineering information, including patterns, plans, compilations, program
devices, formulas, designs, prototypes, methods, techniques, processes,
procedures, programs, or codes ... "381 The protected information,
moreover, can be in tangible or intangible form; and can be stored, compiled,
or memorialized physically, electronically, graphically, photographically, or
in writing.3 2 The preceding EEA trade secret language appears to indicate
that the federal definition of a trade secret is even more extensive than the
UTSA's definition, as well as the definition in many states' criminal trade
secret statutes.383 One commentator contends that the definition of an EEA
trade secret is so broad that it:
May result, however, in dangerous implications for the free mobility
of labor. Employers may shy away from hiring highly qualified
individuals for fear of liability under the EA. Similarly, employees
may hesitate to change jobs, unclear about whether the knowledge
3 Set 18 U.S.C. S 1831(a); 18 U.S.C. S 1832(b).
3-" See 18 U.S.C. S 1831(a).
3 See 18 U.S.C. S 1832(a).
3W See 18 U.S.C. S 1839(3) (2000).
381 Id.
3 Set id.
3W See Desmet, supra note 8, at 116-17.
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they bring to a new company may fall under the definition of trade
secret.3s
Yet, regardless of the scope of the definition, the essence of a trade secret, in
federal and state statutory law as well as the common law, is that the
information is not publicly known.
An important factor, legally and practically, to apply to determine
whether information is a legally protected trade secret is the degree of
security measures adopted by the owner to maintain the secrecy of the
information. The extent of security, one recalls, need not be total or
extraordinary, but merely "reasonable" under the factual circumstances of a
particular case. 385 "Reasonable steps is likely to be interpreted by looking at
the presence, or absence, of a corporate compliance program designed to
protect trade secrets." 386 Yet, the security measures taken by the owner
should be commensurate with the value of the trade secret. Otherwise, if the
owner of the trade secret fails to take reasonable protective measures under
the circumstances, then there is no felony under the EEA for obtaining the
secret. 7
The EEA also construes the "theft" of trade secrets very broadly, as the
knowing misappropriation of a trade secret without the owner's consent, or
obtaining trade secrets by fraud, artifice, or deception.3ss The EEA also is in
accord with state common and statutory law in one fundamental sense; that
is, "[t]aking advantage of a skill learned on the job or of knowledge gained
during employment, if not acquired by illegal means, also does not fall under
the scope of the EEA."
389
C. "Plans and Strategies" Case Law
There only have been a few reported cases involving the EEA, and none
involving plans and strategies type information; rather the reported cases
have dealt with the theft of highly scientific type information.39 Moreover,
l4 d. at 117.
3M See id.
3% Id. at 117-18. "Such a compliance program should have as its goals (1) stressing proprietary
claims to confidential information, (2) restricting access to trade secrets, (3) warning employees and
visitors of the existence of trade secrets, and (4) publicizing the consequences of misappropriation." Id.3W See id. at 118.
30 See 18 U.S.C. S 1831(a) (2000); 18 U.S.C. S 1832(a) (2000); Olson, supra note 40, at 866.
3M Desmet, supra note 8, at 111.
390 See id. at 118-23.
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[a]ll these cases are similar in that they constitute instances of clear-
cut theft of trade secrets, often induced by bribes paid to undercover
agents working in sting operations, in which the defendants' guilt is
flagrant and easily exposed in court. It will be interesting to see
whether, with time, the Department ofjustice's selection of cases to
prosecute remains so careful.39'
Nonetheless, the EEA's expansive definition ofa "trade secret" does explicitly
"392encompass "a plan ... utilized by a person in his business operations ....
Moreover, as pointed out, ample common law and UTSA precedent exists
construing business plans and strategies as legally protected trade secrets, and
based on definitions, rules, and standards very similar to the EEA. The EEA,
finally, "largely rel [ies] upon and mirror[s] the existing articulation of policy
and related doctrinal requirements" of the common law and the UTSA.393
D. Conclusion
The EEA approach appears to draw heavily on state law concepts,
particularly those contained in the UTSA. Since the EEA defines such key
terms as "trade secret" and "theft" so broadly, many trade secret disputes,
naturally including those involving business plans and strategies, now possess
not only costly civil, but also severe criminal ramifications. Trade secret law,
of course, now possesses a very potent protective mechanism. Every firm and
individual, therefore, must be very careful when they obtain information,
especially from, and concerning, competitors. "While individuals face
increased risk from the EEA, organizations - which of course are made up of
many individuals - are especially challenged by this new law."394 As one
commentator has underscored:
[TI he industry in general has something to be quite worried about.
People who come to a company, and sometimes they move more
quickly then you can keep track, bring with them the danger of
polluting the company's environment with the virus of information
that they are not supposed to bring. In circumstances like that, when
the organization can be liable for this infection, companies are
39 Id. at 123.
M 18 U.S.C. S 1839 (2000).
3 Chiappetta, supra note 77, at 72.
3 Pooley, supra note 4, at 632.
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understandably worried about their officers and the company being
indicted for this new federal felony."9
V. THE LEGAL FEASIBILITY OF BusINEss PLANS AND
STRATEGIES AS TRADE SECRETS
The foregoing statutory and case law analysis indicates that at times it is
difficult to ascertain precisely whether business plans and strategies rise to
the level of legally protected trade secrets. Yet, certain general principles and
workable rules can be gleaned from the analysis herein.
As a general rule, if information, in the form of a business plan or
strategy, is independently available to the public, it is not a trade secret:
Similarly, if such information can be easily generated by ordinary competent
people, it is not a trade secret. The non-public nature of the business plan or
strategy is a crucial determinant of trade secret status. Yet, if this information
is not available and cannot be easily replicated, what are the key factors to
determine if it is secret? The amount of time, money, and effort a firm
expended in creating, developing, or obtaining the information certainly is
important. Trade secret law is designed to protect information developed by
a firm for its private use from its own resources or purchased from others for
its own private use with its own funds. Also, legally important is the value of
the plan or strategy to a competitor, because if this information is known to
a firm's competitors, this knowledge might adversely affect the company's
ability to compete effectively. Most importantly, the level of security
measures undertaken by a company to protect its plans and strategies emerges
as an essential test. A firm clearly must indicate that it does not want to have
any outsiders possess this type of information.
Trade secret law does not restrict employees who attempt to benefit from
their lawfully developed skill, ability, and knowledge. Employees, therefore,
who terminate their employment and change employers or commence their
own firms, cannot be sued, enjoined, or prosecuted merely because they
were exposed to business plans or strategies while in the employment.
Rather, the former employer or government (in the role of prosecutor) must
demonstrate that the employee misappropriated or stole a trade secret.
Merely taking advantage of the general knowledge, skills and abilities, and
experience that one acquires by working at a company is not a legal wrong.
Trade secrets, in the form of plans and strategies or otherwise, consist of
distinct, non-public, proprietary information, not one's skills and abilities
395 Pooley, supra note 23, at 1187.
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that one develops at a firm, and not the general knowledge that one acquires
at a firm. Such skills, abilities, and knowledge are considered an integral
natural part of the more experienced departing employee as a person, and not
the property of the employer.
VI. PRACTICAL RECOMMENDATIONS
A. Former Employers
The dramatic growth in the misappropriation and theft of intellectual
property prompted many state legislatures and the federal legislature to
promulgate trade secret statutes to expand the scope of the common law legal
bulwark. Yet, the magnitude of the burden still falls on former employers to
positively take the necessary steps to secure the advantage of trade secret legal
protection, and particularly so when the information is non-technical and
non-scientific type information. Many firms realize too late the true value of
their proprietary plans and strategies type information when these secrets are
misappropriated and disclosed to a competitor. This threat of having
intellectual property, in the form of business plans and strategies, stolen or
misappropriated from one's organization is so real and constant that certain
steps must be taken to prevent particularly this type of occurrence and to take
advantage of the protections afforded by trade secret law.3% In order to
protect their plans and strategies, companies, for example, legitimately can
impose restrictions on their employees, such as confidentiality or non-
disclosure agreements, which not only provide contractual protection, but
also considerably help to bolster a firm's trade secret case.
A basic first step to ensuring legal trade secret protection is for a firm to
identify distinctly its true, proprietary, protectable trade secrets. Next,
designating, labeling, and numbering such information as "confidential" and
"secret" would be quite logical as well as efficacious. A document destruction
system, for example, an in-house shredding procedure, would also be
advisable. Yet, in order to protect information developed by the firm in the
future, such as business plans and strategies, a company should define
internally confidential information and trade secrets as broadly as possible.
A firm should consider adopting a policy that treats all internal
communications as confidential, whether designated as such or not, and
insist that they be held in strictest confidence.
3- See Blackman & Thayer, supra note 92, at 14-17 (discussing in detail the "necessary elements"
to a trade secret protection program, including a proprietary information policy, non-disclosure
agreements, internal security systems, exit interviews, and trade secret audits).
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Other reasonable and elementary efforts to maintain secrecy would be
the registration, badging, and supervision and escorting of visitors; the
fencing or walling of premises and areas; and the locked enclosure to
sensitive work areas and document storage areas; as well as signs cautioning
employees and others as to the confidential and proprietary nature of
information.
In order to successfully litigate a trade secret case, there must be present
in the record evidence that adequate precautions were taken to maintain the
secrecy of the information, and especially so when the information is non-
technical and non-scientific type information. Consequently, the employer
must clearly define internally what is proprietary information. In addition,
the employer must emphasize the legal and ethical obligations of employees,
not only when they commence employment, but especially when they begin
work on confidential projects, and finally when they leave employment. Two
important objectives are accomplished by this designation and underscoring
approach: there is no misunderstanding as to the confidential nature of the
information; and there is distinct evidence of efforts to maintain plans and
strategies private and confidential.
Communication is the key. The employer should not only instruct new
employees as to the existence of trade secret information, particularly in its
plan and strategy embodiment, its legal protection, and their legal and moral
obligations, but also periodically, such as every six months, transmit a memo,
physically and electronically, to the various parts of the firm, particularly to
those employees who use or have access to such trade secrets, reminding
them of their responsibilities to the company. In addition, a systematic audit,
inventory, and registry of the firm's confidential information, including
location, access, and protective measures, should be instituted and prepared
on a regular basis.
Confidential business plans and strategies, moreover, must only be
placed in the hands of those employees and others, such as marketing
personnel and sales representatives, who have real need ofits use. Obviously,
purported trade secrets, in the form of plans or strategies or otherwise,
should not be easily accessible to all employees and stakeholders of the firm.
Such widespread availability will definitely diminish the odds of such
information being deemed a trade secret.
As part of the employer's trade secret education efforts, the employer can
have employees participate in in-house seminars and meetings, whereby the
employees can become acutely aware of the company's concern for
protecting its plans and strategies, the techniques of industrial spies, and the
ramifications of violating trade secret laws. The employee, moreover, must
be told that if he or she has any question regarding whether specific
information is considered confidential, he or she would be well-advised to
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request clarification from a designated company official. Employees who
have participated in such seminars at the least will be aware of the company's
firm position as well as their legal and ethical responsibilities; and hopefully
will have contributed their ideas as to how to prevent disclosure of trade
secrets. Such an education crusade can foster goodwill, generate cost-saving
and practical ideas for the firm, and promote a feeling of participation and a
sense of loyalty among employees.
When an employee resigns or is discharged, the employer should discuss
the disposition and use of trade secrets as part of the employee's exit
interview, including the firm's plans and strategies in the discussion.
Preferably, the employee should be contractually obligated to meet with a
designated company official prior to the termination in order to review the
employee's duties regarding the firm's trade secrets. Clearly and
emphatically, the departing employee must be informed that trade secrets
belong to the firm, they must be returned, and are not to be disclosed or
used. A checklist and acknowledgment system would be appropriate. A
written follow-up reminder would also be advisable. Such a meeting will
serve as a reminder that the employer is prepared to enforce its rights
pursuant to trade secret law, and that the employee cannot remove from the
employer's premises, and must immediately return to the employer, any
confidential planning or strategic information the employee possesses.
Finally, a letter to the employee's new employer, indicating that the former
employee had access to trade secrets, and informing the new employer of its
legal duties, would be a final prudent practical measure. Such termination
procedures will be highly beneficial to the former employer. First, they
should serve to dissuade to the former employee, and also a new employer,
from attempting to engage in actions that might result in a misappropriation
of trade secrets. Second, formally meeting with the exiting employee may
alert the vigilant employer that the former employee may be about to
wrongfully use or disclose business plans and strategies, and thus a close
monitoring of his or her activities is warranted.
To satisfy the "reasonable" efforts requirements of the law, the employer
can take several more steps. These measures include advising employees of
the existence of a business plan or strategy as a trade secret and its
concomitant protected nature, limiting access to sensitive information to
those on a "need to know" basis, requiring employees to sign confidentiality
and non-disclosure agreements, including a section on confidential
information and trade secrets in the employee handbook, keeping secret
information under "lock and key," both physically and electronically, and
periodically conducting security audits to determine whether trade secret
procedures are being followed. Moreover, a suitable background check on
employees who will have access to confidential planning and strategic
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information is another method to help preserve secrecy. If an investigation
reveals that any low-level employee in a very large firm readily can obtain the
information, the employer would be hard-pressed to establish the
information as a trade secret. Limiting access to computer areas and to
computer systems, as well as photocopying restrictions would be advisable.
Of course, technology's ability to disseminate information widely and rapidly
surely aggravates the problem of maintaining the secrecy of valuable business
information. Merely having s system of computer passwords, for example,
may not be sufficient to pass a "reasonable measures" test; rather, a prudent
firm would be well-counseled to conduct periodic internal examinations to
test for computer system penetration as well as compliance with documented
security policies and procedures. "[ S ] uch measures will communicate to...
employees that the company greatly values the time and effort they spend in
designing innovative products and services and that the management is
taking responsible steps to protect their innovations as well as the goodwill
of the company."39
The employer must be very careful when it shares proprietary
information with third parties, such as agents, consultants, vendors and
suppliers, sub-contractors, licensees, clients, and even customers. If such a
disclosure of a plan or strategy must be made, the employer must ensure that
it is limited and that the third parties are further constrained by
confidentiality and non-disclosure agreements. The employer must insist on
secrecy from third parties, and then must investigate regularly to ensure
compliance. The employer, moreover, must inculcate its employees not to
make any intentional or accidental disclosures of planning or strategic
information to third parties, such as in conferences, seminars, trade shows,
trade associations, in writings to professional, business, and scientific
publications, and in casual, perhaps overheard, conversations. Obviously,
posting such information electronically on the internet, even for very limited
periods of time, must be avoided. The prudent employer should adopt a
policy of reviewing all outgoing materials; and regarding sensitive
information, clearly should avoid fostering a too free of a flow of sensitive
information and too much of a "culture" of access, openness, and
"connectivity".
As a consequence, "[o]rganizations that have implemented internal
security programs are likely to be in the best position to protect their trade
secrets from dishonest competitors while insulating themselves from a trade
secret prosecution. "398 Moreover, such protective "measures are likely to
37 Desmet, supra note 8, at 126.
3 Id. at 95.
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maintain or improve the company's image in the event of a lawsuit, by
showing that safeguards were in place, thus elevating the value of the
company's maintained trade secrets."39
B. New Employers
According to the traditional common law employment-at-will doctrine,
employees can freely leave the employer's employ at any time and for any
reason they want. There is, moreover, nothing inherently legally wrong with
hiring a competitor's employees, regardless of whether the employee
approaches the new firm, or the firm approaches the employee, either
directly or by means of a third party such as a recruiter. The law typically
protects and promotes trade and commerce, competition and
entrepreneurship, and mobility and advancement. There is no legal liability
merely for hiring a competitor's employees; but nonetheless, "[m]ost trade
secret litigation results from people with specialized knowledge leaving to
join an established competitor or to start a competing firm."'4 Of course, if
a firm hires a competitor's employees for the express purpose of obtaining
the competitor's confidential business plans and strategies, such a "raid" very
likely will brand the firm as an illegal misappropriator of trade secrets. Yet,
since the UTSA includes both an actual and constructive standard for
misappropriation liability, "ifa hiring employer knows or has reason to know
that one of its new employees misappropriated the trade secrets of her former
employer, the hiring employer also is liable for that misappropriation and
may be held responsible for significant damages.""° Accordingly, even the
most legal and ethical firm must take special care when hiring new
employees.
One of the most effective ways to avert trade secret entanglements is to
not to allow them to occur in the first place; and one of the most effective
ways to prevent lawsuits is to avoid misunderstanding. A firm practicing
good business sense with respect to trade secrets, in the form of business
plans or strategies or otherwise, thus will have an internal definition, policy,
and position with respect to the wrongfulness of misappropriating trade
secrets. First, avoid access to or receipt of a competitor's confidential
information and intellectual property. This avoidance can be accomplished
by ascertaining in job interviews if potential employees are obligated to their
current or former employers by virtue of trade secret or other intellectual
property law. Presuming such a beholden person is hired, appropriate
3W ld. at 126.
4W Poolcy, supra note 4, at 625.
401 Blackman & Thayer, supra note 92, at 17 n.2.
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measures must be taken to ensure that the employee and the firm do not
contravene trade secret law. 4
Naturally, it will be most helpful for the new employer if it can establish
that its business does not directly compete with the previous employer's
business, for example, by showing that it does not have similar services or
products, and aims at different consumers. Alternatively, if there is an overlap
in business, the new employer can attempt to establish that the former
employee's present position with the new employer is not comparable to his
or her former position, in responsibilities, products, services, geography, and
customers.
Yet, if a firm is planning to commence a campaign to market a product
or service which is similar to a competitor's, and with that competitor's
former personnel, the firm would be very well-advised to take certain
defensive measures, such as to document independent creation,
development, intent, and tactics and eschew using a competitor's exact
terminology, designs, and objectives.
When a newly retained employee was previously working for a
competitor, the new employer also should consider requiring the employee
to sign a written trade secret assurance and agreement. This document would
require the new employee to declare that he or she does not have in his or
her possession any trade secrets or confidential information from the former
employer, naturally including business plans and strategies; and, in addition,
that the new employee's tenure with the firm is predicated on that fact. The
practical result will be "that all employees are hired 'clean,' so as not to infect
the company with another's trade secrets."0
If avoiding civil trade secret legal difficulties is not a sufficient motivation
for the new employer to take all the aforementioned precautionary measures,
then the existence of the EEA and its severe criminal penalties must be
emphasized. Even though to date there have not yet been any reported EEA
business plans or strategies cases, surely an employer, or an employee, does
not want to be the first such defendant! As one commentator wisely warned:
The presence within a business of unauthorized data is comparable
to infection by a virus. Undetected and unchecked, it can become
part of a company's process, product or database. Because the EEA
applies to the mere unauthorized possession of information,
possibilities for infection are extensive. They start with each
employee, especially new hires who often bringwith them a personal
4W See id. at 9-11 (discussing in detail the steps a new employer can take to avoid trade secret
liability during the applicant interview and hiring stages).
4 Pooley, supra note 4, at 626.
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collection of disks, files and documents, or who just know a lot
about a competitor where they used to work.4"
Since federal criminal laws apply to corporate entities, the prudent
corporate employer will adopt a trade secret "compliance plan" that also
perceives the possibility of criminal behavior within the organization and
endeavors to avert it. °5  Significantly, "under the U.S. Sentencing
Commission's guidelines, companies that have a meaningful and efficient
compliance program in place are entitled to mitigation in sentencing.
" 40
6
Moreover, an effective compliance plan can not only reduce points at
sentencing, "but it can also be the key to convincing a federal prosecutor that
the company found to possess trade secrets has in fact been victimized by an
errant employee. In the new climate defined by the EEA, corporate
compliance plans represent the keystone to preparedness."
40 7
C. Employees
An employer who discloses valuable, proprietary, planning or strategic
information to its employees in confidence very likely will be afforded the
protection of trade secret law to prevent the use of this secret information in
competition with it. The employee, consequently, has a legal as well as
ethical obligation not to reveal such trade secret information. In particular,
former and current employees must be cognizant of the potential and
severity of consequences - civil and criminal - from wrongfully utilizing and
disclosing protected information, as well as the damage to one's professional
reputation. Employees, therefore, must very carefully consider any inquiries
they receive from third parties, especially prospective competing employers,
for such information which may be considered proprietary and confidential
by their employer. Naturally, an employee receiving such a request should
not disclose such information unless the employee's manager has approved
the disclosure.
An employee, however, who was involved with confidential business
plans and strategies, and who naturally is concerned with the legal
ramifications thereof, should be prepared to establish firmly that he or she
is not a misappropriator of trade secrets. Obviously, evidence that the
employee did not actually use the former employer's trade secrets would be
axiomatic. Evidence, moreover, that the alleged business plan or strategy
4N Id. at 632.
4s See id.
4M6 Desmet, supra note 8, at 126.
407 Pooley, supra note 4, at 633.
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trade secret failed to provide the former employer with a valuable
commercial advantage, or that the former employer failed to adequately
protect this information, might be dispositive of the trade secret lawsuit. It
also would be most helpful to the employee if he or she can demonstrate that
any skill, experience, training, education, or knowledge received from, or
acquired through, the employer merely was general, industry-wide,
knowledge and expertise, rather than exact trade secret information. The
burden, of course, initially is on the former employer to establish that the
employee had access to more specific proprietary "information" about
company practices, plans, and strategies. Finally, the former employee might
be able to demonstrate that purported trade secret information was
ascertainable through independent creation and discovery or by means of
"reverse engineering."4
VIII. CONCLUSION
Today's global, highly competitive, information economy surely has
heightened the risk of misappropriation of intellectual property. Companies,
however, may be not cognizant that their valuable business information in
the form of plans and strategies may constitute trade secrets entitled to
protection under various legal doctrines. Such ignorance may be costing
companies millions of dollars yearly. Yet, contrary to a surprisingly prevalent
view in the business community, it is not mandatory to secure a patent,
copyright, or trademark in order to classify legally information as a trade
secret. Confidential, proprietary, planning and strategic information that
accords a business a competitive advantage frequently will constitute a trade
secret entitling a firm to legal protection under the common law and state
and predictably federal statutory law. The primary objective of this corpus of
trade secret of law is to prevent a former employee or other competitor from
unfairly appropriating valuable confidential information without paying the
price for the information. As the U.S. Supreme Court underscored in the
seminal Kewanee case; "the maintenance of standards of commercial ethics
and the encouragement of invention are the broadly stated policies behind
trade secret law. 'The necessity of good faith and honest, fair dealing, is the
very life and spirit of the commercial world.'"0
The easily accessible and dynamic nature of technology today can cause
almost any incidence in "similarities" to be construed as questionable under
broadly written trade secret laws. The common law and even present
4 See id. at 629.
4 Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470,481-82 (1974) (citations omitted).
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legislation are a bit imprecise, perhaps purposefully so. Companies
functioning in such a fluid, high-technology, competitive environment must
remain vigilant, not only to protect their proprietary and confidential
information, of course including business plans and strategies, but also to
avoid allegations of trade secret misappropriation.
The analysis conducted herein evidently indicates that companies have
the interest and right to secure trade secret protection on certain kinds of
proprietary information, essential to maintaining and expanding its markets,
and affording companies a competitive advantage, including business plans
and strategies. Yet a firm's claims to secrecy must be balanced against other
competing interests. In particular, the protections afforded a firm by trade
secret law must be counter-weighted against the legitimate interests of
employees in the freedom of movement, speech, and pursuit of livelihood
and advancement. The employees' new employers, moreover, possess a
legitimate interest in using their own employees' knowledge and skills.
Government, consumers, and the public want information that concerns
them and which they have the right to know. These "stakeholders" also want
innovative and useful products and services, as well as vigorous but fair
competition in the marketplace. Society in general wants to benefit from
socially useful information and new beneficial products and services. Yet
without the legal protection afforded by trade secret and intellectual property
law, companies surely would have less incentive to make the costly
investments in research, development, and planning that are essential to
innovation and improvement. Such new information, and the preservation
of its secrecy, are vital to economic prosperity societal prosperity. The
challenge to the law is to balance all these competing rights, obligations, and
interests in an equitable manner. The concise business "plans and strategies"
trade secret analysis conducted herein attests that trade secret law, although
composed of various constituent elements, appears to have successfully
accommodated all the contending claims into a fairly unified corpus of trade
secret law. This legal corpus is emerging as an equitable and equalized legal
sector; and one that produces greater good for all the affected "stakeholders"
involved, and that will produce over time in a maximization of societal value.
